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ABSTRACT
Retribution to the martyrs of the Revolution is one of the core demands of Egypt's 
2011 Revolution.  Almost  three  years  later,  this  demand is  yet  to  be  fulfilled.  The 
purpose of this paper is not to prove the existence of impunity in Egypt but rather to 
propose  an  analytical  framework  that  can  show  how the  Egyptian  legal  system 
perpetuates impunity. I examine two case studies: the Maspero massacre and Ramlat 
Boulaq protests. I argue that impunity is multi-dimensional, and accordingly I define 
two  dimensions  for  analysis  of  the  cases:  strategic  and  structural  dimensions  of 
impunity. Strategic impunity is defined as ad-hoc measures taken by the authorities to 
derail  processes  of  accountability  or  demands  for  truth  and justice,  and structural 
impunity  is  defined  as  inherent,  structural  traits  of  the  legal  system  that  prevent 
successful prosecutions of human rights violations.  In the final  chapter, I  examine 
some measures taken by the authorities' for legislative and security sector reforms. 
Through this examination, I highlight their lack of political will to break the cycle of 
impunity. In contrast, I analyze a proposal made by the “Police for Egypt” initiative for 
security  sector  reform  and  transitional  justice.  I  conclude  that  maintaining  the 
Egyptian legal system as it is will continue to result in impunity for human rights 
violations.
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I. Introduction
On January 25th 2011, National Police day, thousands of Egyptians took to the streets 
to protest police brutality, corruption and the deteriorating economic and social 
conditions gripping the country over the last decades. The calls for protests were made 
by activist youth groups including “We are all Khalid Said”; a face-book page 
dedicated to the memory of a 28-year-old Egyptian from Alexandria who was beaten 
to death by police officers in broad day light. The organizers intended to “subvert the 
celebration of the police and turn the day into an occasion to indict the institution in 
charge of policing—in a sense, putting it on public trial”.1 Ironically, the biggest 
demand of the organizers then, was the removal of Habib al-Adly, the Minister of 
Interior. 
The significance of the Revolution starting on National Police day cannot be 
overlooked as Salwa Ismail rightly noted, “the popular support for the [R]evolution 
was to a large extent motivated by antagonism towards the police, guided by the 
structure of feelings of humiliation, anger, disdain, and revulsion...[where] police 
practices of government, which had affect as their object, undermined the ordinary 
citizen's sense of self and her moral person-hood.”2 It is then no surprise that at least 
99 police stations were burned across the country during the first few days of the 
Revolution.3 These police stations were infamous for practicing torture not only 
against political opponents but also “ordinary citizens due to the deterioration of 
police professional standards and the absence of legal accountability”.4
The massive unprecedented protests resulted in the removal of Hosni Mubarak. The 
protests also tragically resulted in the death of at least 846 protesters and the injury of 
at least 6467.5 The massive scale of human rights violations committed in Mubarak's 
1
    Salwa Ismail, The Egyptian Revolution against the Police, 79:2 Social Research. 435, 435 (2012).
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Cherif Bassiouni, The Fight for Democracy in Egypt’s Liberation Square, Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs, 3 (2011).
5 International Federation for Human Rights [hereinafter FIDH], The Price of Hope: Human Rights 
Abuses During the Egyptian Revolution, 6 (2011), available at http://www.fidh.org/en/north-africa-
middle-east/Egypt/The-Price-of-Hope-Human-Rights; See also Amntesy International, Egypt rises:  
Killings, detentions and torture in the 25 January Revolution (2011) available at 
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era and particularly during his last days has prompted Egyptians to demand 
accountability. As Cherif Bassiouni rightly noted, “subjecting the police to the Rule of 
Law is indispensable.”6 However, the constant demands by protesters and civil society 
groups of accountability for human rights violations have fallen on deaf ears. 
When the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed power on February 
11th 2011, it pledged to assist transition into civilian and democratic rule, to ensure 
retribution to the martyrs and respect the right to peaceful protest. Instead, SCAF 
deceived millions of Egyptians and “unleashed violent repression against peaceful 
protesters and took steps to retain as much power as possible and remain beyond the 
reach of the law.”7 The 16-month rule of SCAF was characterized by aggression 
against peaceful protesters, torture, arbitrary detention, military trials and other gross 
human rights violations. Egypt's infamous police, aided by its military counterparts, 
returned with a vengeance against Egyptian protesters who are still heroically 
struggling to fulfill the demands of the Revolution. 
In November 2011, security forces attacked peaceful protesters for an entire week 
causing the death of at least 51 and injuring hundreds; many of them suffered from 
permanent eye loss.8 In February 2012, following protests against the killing of 70 al-
Ahly football club fans in Port Said stadium, security forces attacked peaceful 
protesters killing at least 16 and injuring hundreds.9 In October 2011, military police 
attacked a peaceful demonstration of Coptic Christians by live ammunition and 
crushed them with military armored vehicles, causing at least 28 deaths and injury of 
hundreds.10 In December 2011, military police violently dispersed a sit-in at the 
Cabinet of Ministers resulting in the death of at least 17 protesters.11 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE12/027/2011/en/b33cf2ea-e057-4a34-905b-
46a897c4fe6d/mde120272011en.pdf.
6
           Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 3.
7 Amnesty International, Brutally Unpunished and Unchecked: Egypt's Military Kill and Torture 
Protesters with Impunity, 5 (2012), available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/.../mde120172012en.pdf.
8 Amnesty International, Agents of Repression: Egypt's Police and the Case for Reform, 7 (2012), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE12/029/2012/en/576aa9cc-bd07-4724-
a410-95b02009c317/mde120292012en.pdf.
9 Id. at 14. 
10 Amnesty International, supra note 7,  at 6. 
11 Id. 
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These incidents reveal a policy of systematic state repression, in which government 
forces continue to commit grave human rights violations with complete impunity. 
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that widespread human rights violations 
committed with impunity is not a new phenomenon that is associated with post-
revolutionary Egypt.  Rather, this state policy is a continuation of a pattern of abuses 
that have continued for several decades and remained mostly unpunished. 
Since the creation of the Egyptian republic, the state continued to be “dominated by an 
extremely powerful executive who enjoys expansive constitutional (and extra-
constitutional) grants of authority, thereby exerting significant control over all facets 
of government from the nominally autonomous legislature to the judicial branch.”12 
After Mubarak took power in 1981, he pledged to maintain the rule of law, however 
shortly after he “extended the state of emergency, promulgated laws to exclude 
opposition parties from local councils and tightened the grip of the ruling National 
Democratic Party (NDP) over parliament.”13 In addition, the Mubarak regime used 
“police powers to preserve and enhance their grasp of the country and to support a 
corrupt oligarchy...[where as] the police became, de facto, the private security 
apparatus of the oligarchy, as well as the visible oppressor of the people.”14  
Furthermore, the infamous Emergency Law15 had been continuously in force since 
1967 with the exception of eighteen months between 1980 and 1981. This law gave 
tremendous powers to the executive authority and sanctioned the systematic repression 
by the police. It also allowed “for extended detention without trial, denies detainees 
habeas corpus, bans labor strikes, prohibits demonstrations without police permission, 
justifies press censorship, and sanctions trials of political prisoners by special courts to 
deliver “swift justice” and restrict defendants' right to appeal.”16  
12 Charles Robert Davidson, Reform and Repression in Mubarak's Egypt, 24 Fletcher F. World Aff. 
75, 5 (2000).
13 A.M Lesch, Egypt's Spring: Causes of the Revolution, 18:3 Middle East Policy 35–48 (2011); 
During Mubarak's last decade, the two houses of parliament, the People's Assembly and the Shoura 
Council were largely dominated by the NDP. In the last parliament elections in 2010, the NDP got 
97% of the seats, thus ceding all the legislative powers to the executive, See Davidson, supra note, 
12, at 5. 
14 Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 3.
15 Law No. 162 of 1958 (Presidential Decree enacting the Emergency Law), al-Jarīdah al-rasmīyah, 
27 September 1958 (Egypt).
16 Hazem Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt 199 (1st. ed. 2012).
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Armed with sweeping powers of the Emergency Law, the police became infamous for 
their brutality. Hossam Bahgat, former director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal 
Rights (EIPR) explained that “an ordinary, law abiding citizen will cross the road to 
avoid any contact with police [because] they know that, even if they have not done 
anything wrong, the police are notoriously abusive and act with complete impunity--
and not in the interest of the citizen.”17 The Ministry of Interior had long been 
associated with “routinized violent practices against civilians held in police stations, 
including torture and sexual violation, the internment of political dissidents by its state 
security organs, the surveillance of activists, the rigging of elections, and the 
protection of core ruling regime interests.”18 It important to note that torture is not only 
practiced against political opponents but also ordinary citizens.19 The police are also 
infamous for their corruption; whether by taking bribes or even fabrication of drug 
charges where the latter became “a common procedure and understood as a 
mechanism of control of young men.”20 These patterns of aggression have largely 
contributed to the people perceiving the police as a “vast network of aggressive 
overseers”21  rather than their protectors, as well as the police perceiving themselves as 
above the law due to the fact that “successful prosecutions of ordinary police officers 
are still extremely rare.”22
Police abuses, in particularly torture, have formed a systematic pattern that has gone 
largely unpunished.23 A 2011 Human Rights Watch report on torture found that the 
17 Noha El Hennawy, The making of a police state: From the battle of Ismailiya to Khaled Saeed, ’Al 
Masry ’Al Youm, Jan. 27, 2011, available at http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/making-
police-state-battle-ismailiya-khaled-saeed.
18 Ismail, supra note 1, at 435.
19 Egyptian human rights organizations have explained this phenomenon in their submission to the 
Human Rights Council during the Universal Periodic Review of Egypt in 2010. They explain: 
"torture is now used for a long list of reasons, including to intimidate or recruit police informers, to 
discipline or punish at the behest of a third party, to force a citizen to renounce an apartment or plot 
of land, as part of a hostage-taking policy that usually nets women and children related to a suspect, 
and to punish those who dare to challenge policemen’s absolute authority or demand to see judicial 
warrants or arrest and search orders.” Human Rights Watch, Work on Hum until He Confesses: 
Impunity for Torture in Egypt, 12, (2011), available at 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/egypt0111webwcover.pdf.
20 Ismail, supra note 1, at 441; A former police officer admitted that in the 1990s in Cairo alone, the 
police fabricated 57,000 drug possession charges on an annual basis. Id.
21 Id. at 442. 
22 Human Rights Watch, supra note 19, at 12. 
23 Amnesty International concluded that torture was “systematic in police stations, prisons and [State 
Security Investigations] SSI detention centers and, for the most part, committed with impunity…. 
[Security and plainclothes police assault people] openly and in public as if unconcerned about 
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Egyptian government is “failing miserably to provide victims of torture and ill-
treatment effective remedy, or to deter such abuses from occurring in the future.”24 The 
report concluded that impunity “prevails with regard to torture and ill-treatment, since 
those guilty of such abuses have little expectation or reason to fear [that] they will be 
held to account.”25 The government, until this day, has continuously denied that acts of 
torture are systematic, and claims that they are only isolated incidents who are all 
investigated and those involved are punished.26 
When victims of torture eventually file a complaint at the Public Prosecution, they are 
faced with slow and denied justice.27 The Public Prosecution does open official 
investigations in each complaint it receives, however rarely do these complaints reach 
the phase of a trial due to “an inadequate legal framework, police intimidation of 
victims who then withdraw complaints, and ineffective and delayed investigations.”28 
There have only been six convictions of police officers between 2006 and 2009.29 Even 
in the cases where torture complaints do reach the courts, the verdicts issued against 
the police officers do not match the gravity of the crime and do not provide any 
redress to the victims. 
One famous case is that of actress Habiba Said who was sentenced to 10 years 
imprisonment for killing her husband; the sentence was based on an extracted 
confession under torture.30 After serving five years in prison, the police were able to 
arrest the actual murderers. A Giza Criminal Court then acquitted Said and sentenced 
the police officer who extracted her confession to a suspended sentence of six months 
imprisonment and his removal from his post for one year.31 The Court did not however 
possible consequences. Amnesty International, Annual Report for 2010, (2011), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/egypt/report-2010 ; Human Rights Watch reached the same 
conclusion where it stated that “law enforcement officials have used torture and ill-treatment on a 
widespread, deliberate, and systematic basis over the past two decades to glean confessions and 
information, or to punish detainees.” See Human Rights Watch, supra note 19, at 2.
24 Human Rights Watch, supra note 19, at 2. 
25 Id.
26 Id. The Ministry of Interior has also developed the tactic of discrediting the information, and 
slandering the victims, Id.
27 The Public Prosecution “closes the majority of complaints without indicting anyone.” Id. at 40. 
28 Id. at 2. 
29 According to government statistics made public, Id. 
30 Id. at 82. 
31 Ahmad Shalaby, Habiba Innocent of Killing her Husband... Five Thieves Convicted and the Officer, 
’Al Masry ’Al Youm, May 9, 2007, available at http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?
5
order any reparation to Said. This case can give the reader a glimpse of the legal 
reality of prosecuting police crimes in national courts. The verdict did not provide 
adequate reparation to the victim which she rightfully deserved, and it did not actually 
imprison the officer or remove him permanently from his post. One can then imagine 
how police officers believe that they can practice torture with impunity. In the rare 
cases in which they are actually prosecuted, they will still roam the streets free and 
eventually return to their jobs, only to continue the practice they are so deeply 
accustomed to. 
One of the rare cases where impunity did not prevail is that of Emad al-Kebir, a micro 
bus driver who was tortured and sodomized by police officers in Boulaq al-Daqror 
police station. The officers filmed the ordeal and circulated it in al-Kebir's 
neighborhood. The video was found by bloggers who circulated it on-line, and 
eventually al-Kebir filed a lawsuit against the officers. A Giza Criminal Court 
sentenced the officer Ismail Nabih and policeman Reda Fathi to three years 
imprisonment.32 While this sentence presents a rare case of accountability for police 
abuse; Ismail Nabih returned to work after serving a third of his sentence. Human 
rights lawyers appealed this decision before the State Administrative Court, however 
the Court rejected their case and upheld the reinstatement of Nabih in the police.33
Another important case is that popularly referred to as the “Black Wednesday” 
incident. In May 2005, female protesters and journalists who were covering protests 
against the proposed 2005 constitutional amendments were attacked by police men and 
men in civilians clothes who were associated with the police. The women were 
sexually assaulted, had their clothes torn, molested and verbally abused.34 Four of the 
female protesters “testified that they were called ‘sluts’ and ‘whores’ as well as being 
ArticleID=56888&IssueID=661.
32 BBC News, Egypt police jailed for torture, Nov. 5, 2007, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7078785.stm.
33 Sahar al at, Ṭ ʻ al-qad  al-id r  yarfud man  Islam Nabih min al- amal, al-yawm  al-s biạ̄ʼ ā ī ̣ ʻ ʻ ā ʻ, Jan. 26, 
2010,  available at http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?
NewsID=181978&SecID=97&IssueID=62#.UpDmkUOXXL8.
34 See Press Release, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights [hereinafter EIPR], Egypt held to account 
for failing to protect women demonstrators from sexual assault - Commission tells Egyptian 
Government to compensate women as well as to investigate the assaults and punish those 
responsible, Mar. 14, 2013, available at http://eipr.org/en/pressrelease/2013/03/14/1657. 
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touched inappropriately on their breasts and private parts.”35 The four women then 
lodged formal complaints at the Public Prosecution which “refused to take the 
testimony of several eyewitnesses and failed to conduct thorough independent 
investigations...the women were later threatened, by unidentified individuals.”36 
Shortly after, the Public Prosecution decided to shelve the case citing that the women 
failed to present adequate evidence and that their testimonies contained 
inconsistencies.37 After domestic efforts for justice proved to be futile, the women took 
up their complaint to the African Commission on Human and People's Rights. In 2013, 
the Commission delivered its communication stating that the “violations perpetrated 
were palpable physically as well as medically proven...the State did not need further 
information to proceed with the investigations that should have brought the 
perpetrators to justice…the Commission urged Egypt to hold an investigation and 
punish those found responsible.”38 The present case here demonstrates the climate of 
impunity that the state has fostered where as the bodies in charge of investigations and 
prosecutions have chosen to accommodate the wishes of the executive and deny justice 
to the victims. The victims, who resorted to regional human rights mechanisms, were 
able to shed light on this crucial aspect of the state's failure and lack of willingness to 
prosecute human rights violations. 
It then becomes easier for the reader to understand why Egyptians have been 
demanding accountability, as well as their aspirations for a free democratic country 
that respects their basic right to life, freedom and dignity. This brings me to the 
purpose of this paper. First, I would like to emphasize that my goal here is not to prove 
the existence of impunity in Egypt, as this might be common knowledge to most of the 
Egyptian population and thus an abundant aspect to prove. At the same time, while 
this impunity may be obvious, the reasons behind it are not. In trying to identify the 
causes of impunity in Egypt, I faced several difficulties as I could not pin point its 
primary cause. Is it due to Egyptian legislation? Is it due to the non-independence of 
the Public Prosecution and the Forensics Department? Is it due to the lack of political 
will of the state to prosecute abuses of its apparatus? These possible reasons are not all 
35 Id.
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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exclusively features of the legal system as some of them are political decisions. The 
diversity of these reasons and their different sources are precisely the reason why it is 
difficult to study impunity in Egypt.  Impunity has different and multiple dimensions, 
in which none of these dimensions are exclusively responsible for it. 
Then, several important questions arise: what role does the Egyptian legal system play 
in perpetuating impunity? In other words, what are the features of the legal system that 
contribute to the perpetuation of impunity? How do all these features of the legal 
system operate to produce the end result of impunity? How does the state's lack of 
political will affect legal proceedings for human rights violations? The latter question 
is particularly important as it captures important instances that are not necessarily 
inherent features of the legal system. 
Thus, the goal of this paper is to propose an analytical framework that can overcome 
these difficulties by identifying all these different dimensions of impunity, and also 
explain how do they operate to produce impunity. This framework could be applied to 
different cases before the civilian and military judiciaries. It is crucial to understand 
all these multiple dimensions of impunity and explain how they operate in different 
ways, in order to be able to propose effective measures that can combat impunity. 
 
The following chapter discusses impunity in the framework of international law, then I 
review selected literature on the definitions of impunity. I end the chapter by defining 
my analytical framework for studying impunity in Egypt.  The third chapter discusses 
the case of the killing of 28 Coptic Christians by military forces, popularly known as 
Maspero. The fourth chapter discusses the case of the Nile City Towers protests, also 
known as Ramlat Boulaq protests.  The final chapter discusses some measures of 
legislative and security sector reforms taken by the authorities and the “Police for 
Egypt” initiative on security sector reform and transitional justice. 
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II. The Multiple Dimensions of Impunity
A. Developments in International Law
In the past, international law was solely focused on governing relationships between 
states. Steven R. Ratner argues that “the notion that the law would govern behavior of 
governments vis-a-vis their own citizens, let alone prescribe accountability for 
individuals for violations of such norms, was anathema to the entire exercise”.39 
However, international law changed in the aftermath of the Second World War, where 
as prior to the Nuremberg trials,40 it “had not previously addressed a state's treatment 
of its own citizens, much less imposed criminal sanctions for such conduct”.41 The 
Nuremberg precedent not only presented the new concept of individual criminal 
responsibility but also paved the way for the adoption of several conventions on 
international crimes that explicitly prescribed a duty to prosecute grave breaches of 
their provisions.  
The four Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1949, set a legal obligation on State Parties 
to “to search for, prosecute and punish those individuals suspected of committing 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions”.42 The Genocide Convention not only 
prohibited genocide but also set up an obligation of states to prevent and punish.43 The 
United Nations Convention against Torture also sets an obligation on State Parties to 
either prosecute or extradite any persons found in their territory who allegedly 
committed torture.44 
39 Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law , 87 Geo. L.J. 
707 , 711 (1999). 
40 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, was set up by the Allied forces to try Nazi 
officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
41 Diane F. Orentlicher, The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, The Yale 
Law Journal 100:8 2537, 2555 (1991). 
42 Mary Margaret Penrose, Impunity- Inertia, Inaction, and Invalidity: A Literature Review, 17 B.U. 
Int'l L.J. 269, 286.  These grave breaches may include “such acts as willful killing, torture or 
inhuman treatment, and willfully causing great suffering or serious bodily injury ” in times of 
armed conflict. Id. 
43 Art. 1 states that “the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of 
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to 
punish.” Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 
art. I, 78 U.N.T.S. 
44 Articles 5, 6, 7, 8. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
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Despite the establishment of the duty to prosecute grave violations of the above 
mentioned covenants, the claim of a customary duty to prosecute gross human rights 
violations is a fairly recent claim.45 Due to the inconsistency of state practice for 
prosecution of gross human rights violations including the numerous amnesty laws 
issued by states, scholars have argued that the duty to prosecute jus cogens crimes is 
practically non-existent.46 On the other hand, other legal scholars have argued that 
there is an emerging norm of a duty to prosecute in international customary law.47
 
Several developments that occurred in the 1990s tend to support the claims of the 
latter group. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission and Court on 
Human Rights declared the illegality of amnesty laws and affirmed the duty to 
investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators of gross human rights violations and 
international humanitarian law.48 In 1992, the Inter-American Commission issued a 
landmark communication on the 'Due Obedience and Full Stop' amnesties laws in 
Argentina where it found that that the amnesty law violated Argentina's obligations 
under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the American 
Convention on Human Rights.49 The Inter-American Court and Commission also 
45 Ranter, supra note 39, at 730. 
46 Cherif Bassiouni notes that “the practice of states evidences that, more often than not, impunity has 
been allowed for jus cogens crimes...and the duty to prosecute or extradite is more inchoate than 
established”. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 
59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63, 66 (1996).  Mary Margaret Penrose makes a similar assertion 
arguing that “state practice for prosecution of international crimes based on torture, genocide, and 
other similarly heinous crimes is practically non-existent”. Mary Margaret Penrose, It's Good to Be 
the King!: Prosecuting Heads of State and Former Heads of State Under International Law, 39 
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 193, 204 (2000-2001 ). See also Ratner, supra note 39. See also Michael 
Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human  
Rights Crimes, 59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 41(1996). 
47 See e.g. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human 
Rights Violations in International Law, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 449 (1990). Christopher Joyner argues that 
the “corpus of international law that has evolved since 1945 clearly imposes obligations upon 
government parties to investigate and prosecute suspected violators of humanitarian law (i.e., the 
laws of war) and other high human rights crimes (including genocide, torture, and crimes against 
humanity) ”. Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The 
Universal Declaration and the Search for Accountability, 26 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y. 591, 597 
(1998). 
48 See, e.g.,Velisquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988), 11 172, 
174 and Juan Meneses v. Chile, Case 11.228, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 34/96, 
OEA/SER.L.V.II.95 doc. 7 rev. 11 67-69 (1997) . 
49 The Commission observed that: “the effect of the passage of the Laws and Decrees was to cancel 
all proceedings pending against those responsible for past human rights violations. These measures 
closed off any judicial possibility of continuing the criminal trials intended to establish the crimes 
denounced; identify their authors, accomplices and accessories after the fact, and impose the 
corresponding punishments. The petitioners, relatives or those injured by the human rights 
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declared that amnesty laws in Uruguay, El Salvador, Chile and Peru were incompatible 
with the American Convention.50 The jurisprudence of the Inter-American human 
rights system affirms that “any similar measures that hinder the investigation, 
prosecution, and punishment of serious human rights violations are considered as 
incompatible with the State Parties' obligations and therefore have no force or effect”.51 
Furthermore, the Court also enforced the principle of the State Parties' duty to protect 
individuals from torture including the duty to prosecute torture claims.52 The 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American System has indeed significantly “given rise to and 
reinforced international legal principles and standards governing the obligations of 
states to ensure individual accountability for serious human rights violations.”53
Another important case that helped in the development of the doctrine of prosecutions 
is that of former Chilean President General Augusto Pinochet where an arrest warrant 
was issued against him in 1998, in response to an extradition request by Spain for 
crimes of torture against Chileans and others.  The case triggered intensive debate on 
the validity of head-of-state immunity for international crimes and was examined by 
Britain's highest court where nine of the twelve judges ruled that Pinochet was not 
protected by any doctrine of immunity as a former head of state.54 The case also 
violations have been denied their right to a recourse, to a thorough and impartial judicial 
investigation to ascertain the facts...Under Article 1.1 of the [American] Convention, the State 
Parties are obliged "to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all 
persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms....The 
Laws and the Decree [of amnesty] sought to, and effectively did obstruct, the exercise of the 
petitioners' right [to a fair trial].” Alicia Consuelo Herrera et al. v. Argentina, Case 10.147, Inter-
Am. C.H.R. Report 28/ 92, OEA/Ser.LN/II.83 doc. 14 corr. 1 32 (1992-93) . 
50 For example, see the judgment of the Barrios Altos Case where the Court stated that “all amnesty 
provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of measures designed to eliminate 
responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the investigation and 
punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations.” Brian D. Tittemore, Ending 
Impunity in the Americas: The Role of the Inter-American Human Rights System in Advancing 
Accountability for Serious Crimes Under International Law, 12 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 429, 446- 7 
(2005-2006 ).
51 Id., at 448-9. 
52 In the case of  Velasquez-Rodriguez, the Court noted that: “the State is obligated to investigate 
every situation involving a violation of the rights protected by the Convention. If the State 
apparatus acts in such a way that the violation goes unpunished and the victim's full enjoyment of 
such rights is not restored as soon as possible, the State has failed to comply with its duty to ensure 
the free and full exercise of those rights to the persons within its jurisdiction.” Id., at 449. 
53 Id.
54 The court found later that he was too ill to fit trial.  It is important to also note that the judges did 
not merely rely on British national legislations but have largely invoked international customary 
law. Susan Waltz, Prosecuting Dictators: International Law and the Pinochet Case, 18 World 
Policy Journal 101 (2001). 
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“reinforced the prohibition of torture as a peremptory norm of international law and 
specifically tested the extradition provisions of the 1984 Torture Convention and 
provided [an] opinion on claims of universal jurisdiction relevant to egregious abuse 
of human rights”.55 
This period also witnessed the establishment of several international criminal tribunals 
such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court.  
These courts played a prominent role in advancing accountability for serious crimes 
under international law.56 The statutes of the international criminal tribunals and 
courts also affirmed the principle of individual criminal responsibility, which was first 
introduced in the Nuremberg trials, though it had remained mostly not enforced. 
International human rights mechanisms also played a role the development of 
international law where they have “formulated a doctrine that places positive 
obligations upon states to investigate, prosecute and punish violations of the rights 
protected under their governing instruments, including those that constitute serious 
crimes under international law.”57 While these mechanisms are mostly treaty-based, 
they have nevertheless supported the trend towards accountability in general. For 
example, while the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (ICCPR) is 
textually silent on the duty of State Parties to punish violations of the rights it ensures, 
the UN Human Rights Committee established in some cases that states have a “duty to 
investigate and prosecute those committing disappearances, summary executions, ill-
treatment, and arbitrary arrest and detention.”58
B. Definitions of Impunity
The United Nations defines impunity as “the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of 
bringing the perpetrators of violations to account - whether in criminal, civil, 
administrative or disciplinary proceedings - since they are not subject to any inquiry 
55 Id. at 103. 
56 Tittmore, supra note 50, at 430. 
57 Id. 
58 See, e.g., Human Rights Commitee, Comments on Nigeria, P284, in Report of the Human Rights 
Committee, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 41, U.N. Doc. A/51/40 (1996). 
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that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to 
appropriate penalties, and to making reparations to their victims.”59 Thus, the UN 
definition of impunity means non-punishment and lack of reparations to victims. Since 
the UN definition focuses on non-punishment, it excludes other measures of 
accountability and other forms of social reconciliation that may include “symbolic and 
public forms of compensation, such as national truth and reconciliation 
commissions”.60 It also excludes the standards of participation of victims in the 
proceedings such as “restoration [which] might include compensatory payments, the 
right of return, and rehabilitation”.61  While the UN definition can satisfy explaining 
the meaning of the word impunity, it does not explain how this impunity comes to 
exist. In other words, the definition is not sufficient to explain the reasons contributing 
to the existence of a climate of impunity. These reasons are crucial to understand any 
context of impunity as it can differ in each situation. For example, impunity in the 
context of a civil war can be very different from impunity in the context of 
authoritarian regimes.  These conflicts and ambiguities in the definition do not 
provide any help to address the multiple dimensions of impunity in different contexts. 
Several authors have used the UN definition as a starting point for defining impunity 
but have expanded their analysis to explain the causes and reasons for impunity in its 
multiple dimensions. 
Madeline Morris argues that there are three main reasons for impunity: insufficient 
resources, political impediments, and a lack of government willingness to prosecute.62  
She adds that political constraints can limit accountability, where they may arise “from 
the need to continue to live with, and perhaps to share power with or even to work 
toward reconciliation with the perpetrator population or constituency”.63 She argues 
that a state can be faced with a situation where the violations are too massive and 
include a large number of perpetrators and victims, that the judicial system cannot 
handle due to lack of training of judges and other insufficient resources. This leads to 
59 U.N. ESC, Rep. of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity on 
its 61st Sess.,Feb. 8, 2005, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (by Diane F. Orentlicher).
60 C. Joyner, supra note 47, at  617. 
61 Id.
62 Madeline H. Morris , International Guidelines against Impunity: Facilitating Accountability , 59 
Law & Contemp. Probs. 29, 30 (1996).
63 Id.
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a situation where “prosecutions and other accountability mechanisms as well as victim 
compensation schemes all therefore demand extensive financial, physical, and human 
resources.”64 It can also be due to the lack of will at the local and international level.65 
The author here presents important insight into the circumstances of impunity that the 
UN definition fails to explain. The analysis of these imminent constraints are 
particularly important as it can present an opportunity to provide solutions to address 
these issues. Morris does indeed propose four second-best approaches as a “taxonomy 
of comprise”.66 These compromises also challenge the zero-sum game that the UN 
definition implies in its strict non-punishment approach. 
Another setback of the UN definition is its failure to address different levels of 
impunity. By focusing on a general criteria of non-punishment, it fails to provide a 
measure that addresses situations in which some, and not widespread impunity exists. 
In other words, the UN definition considers impunity as a general constant factor, 
however different situations have produced varying contexts of impunity. Nick 
Jorgesen conducted a study on analyzing the different levels of impunity in different 
countries in which he set three categories of impunity “none, moderate and 
widespread/severe”.67 In testing the levels of impunity, he used several predictors 
including the presence of civil wars, restrictions on the media, electoral democracies, 
and levels of corruption.68 The importance of classifying different levels of impunity 
as well as measuring the effect of the above-mentioned predictors on the result of 
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Morris proposes the following approaches: first, a “decision may be made to pursue accountability 
only for some subset of the individuals responsible for the crimes by the international courts” and 
the remaining bulk to be prosecuted in national courts. Second, utilization of plea-bargaining that 
can include “a substantial sentence reduction in return for a full confession, a guilty plea, and an 
apology to the victim”. Third, “a sentence-reduction may be provided for all perpetrators without 
the requirement of any plea bargain” which can relieve the state “the long-term burden of 
supporting a massive prison population and/or in the interests of reconciliation”. Fourth, “legal 
action [could be taken] against perpetrators for lesser offenses than the genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, or other serious human rights violations actually committed”.  She also 
adds that civil reparations to victims can also be used as a second-best approach where the 
successor government can provide reparations to victims rather than the perpetrators doing so. She 
also adds that other approaches of accountability can be pursued such as lustrations and truth 
commissions however she insists that these measures do not achieve full accountability.  Id., at 31-
32.
67 Nick Jorgensen, Impunity and Oversight: When Do Governments Police Themselves?, 8:4 J. Human 
Rights. 385, 386 (2009). 
68 Id.
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impunity is crucial as it can explain how different circumstances can have a decisive 
effect on the varying climate of impunity. 
Furthermore, Jorgensen provides an expansive description of different contexts of 
impunity that the UN definition fails to address. First, it can be the result of “a trade-
off (either tacit or explicit) between a state’s security apparatus and other branches of 
government.”69 Second, it can also be due to “the relative lack of salience of human 
rights violations compared to other political values during political crises.”70 The 
population could be more lenient towards stability rather than accountability in times 
of crises, or they could have other pressing problems on their minds such as poor 
economic and social conditions, thus making the issue of impunity more of a “luxury 
rather than a necessity.”71 Third, it may also be “a consequence of weak or 
underdeveloped legal institutions...[or] poorly designed legal rules that create perverse 
incentives for members of a state’s coercive apparatus.”72 Fourth, it could be “the 
result or outcome of deliberate policies of repression or the consequence of 
unbalanced power relations across the various arms of the state.”73  Fifth, it can be 
created by cases of exceptional circumstances where decrees and laws are passed 
giving police and military powers a wide range of discretion in detentions, arrests, and 
surveillance; for example, the suspension of constitutional rights of citizens.74  Sixth, 
victims of human rights violations can be from a marginal or vulnerable group that 
lacks “the financial, legal, political, and social resources to make successful 
complaints against state actors”.75 
While Jorgensen's discussion of the different contexts of impunity is important, it does 
not set a methodological framework that can capture the multi-dimensional aspects of 
impunity in different situations. In other words, the results of his study reveal the 
relationship between the predictors and the levels of impunity, but do not explain how 
impunity functions or operates in each country. 
69 Id. at 389. 
70 Id. at 390.
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 387. 
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In a more specific case study of the Romanian legal system, Monica L. Macovei  
examined the institutional traits of the legal system that have enabled police 
misconduct and lack of accountability.76 She referred to several factors such as the 
militarization and centralization of the police, military trials for police misconduct, 
inability to appeal prosecution's decisions, police investigations of allegations of 
police misconduct, and the impossibility of civil remedies to victims in the absence of 
criminal prosecutions.77 More importantly, she does not only examine incidents of  
non-punishment of violations, as the UN definition suggests, but also goes on to 
explain how this non-punishment came about. However, she only focuses on 
institutional traits of the system where as there could be other factors that lay outside 
of the institutional dimensions of a legal system that can also contribute to impunity. 
Christopher C. Joyner's analysis of impunity acknowledges this issue where he 
provides two-dimensional distinctions for describing impunity; normative and factual. 
He defines factual impunity as impunity facilitated by the government where as “the 
particular circumstances and internal political-social conditions permit gross human 
rights violators to evade prosecution in some state.”78 On the other hand, the normative 
dimension of impunity is “often tied to the presence of a military justice system and 
various national impunity laws.”79 The military judiciary often leads to acquittals and 
there is a general logical link between it and impunity.80  Other factors falling under 
the normative dimension include national amnesty laws. The Latin American 
experiences of transition to civilian governments provide a clear example of this tactic 
where military regimes ensured the issuance of general amnesties for past human 
rights abuses by their forces. In Argentina, President Alfonsin issued a law “that 
exonerated all military personnel below the rank of brigadier general from any 
criminal liability for acts committed between 1976 and 1983.”81 In 1978, the Pinochet 
government passed a “self-amnesty law... which "forgot" all crimes committed by the 
76 Monica L. Macovei, Police impunity in Romania: Military jurisdiction over misconduct cases, 10:1 
International Journal of Research and Policy 107 (2012). 
77 Id.
78 C. Joyner, supra note 47, at 616.
79 Id. 
80 Id.
81 Jon M. Van Dyke & Gerald W. Berkely, Redressing Human Rights Abuses, 20 Denv. J. Int'l L. & 
Pol'y. 243, 250 (1991-1992).
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military after September 11, 1973.”82 Similarly, in 1979, a “reciprocal amnesty” was 
issued in Brazil preventing investigations of abuses by military and police forces.83 In 
Uruguay, the “Impunity Law” was passed via a referendum which shields all military 
personnel from appearing before civilian courts for human rights violations.84 
Joyner argues that the causes of impunity are more factual than normative. The power 
and influence that security and military institutions possess ultimately produce 
impunity as “explained by the facts and circumstances of situations, rather than the 
normative instruction or legal mandate of international criminal law.”85 Impunity is 
thus determined by the “distribution of political and social power in that society 
[where as] control of that power determines the likelihood of impunity.”86 Accordingly, 
it is not the law that determines impunity but rather the political power in charge of 
applying and interpreting the law.87  I disagree with Joyner's assertion that the factual 
is more responsible for perpetuating impunity than the normative. I think both factors 
play an equally important role in determining the result of impunity. It is true that 
impunity may not be a direct result of  law, as Egyptian legislations criminalize torture 
and extra-judicial killings, but it is also not only a direct result of the power relations 
of security and military forces in society. There are normative institutional traits 
present in the Egyptian context that widely contribute to impunity, such as the military 
courts. In all fairness, Joyner does concludes that impunity is “multi-dimensional 
where it stems from a complex nexus of normative, circumstantial, and situational 
causes” and not a “construct normally found in positive law”.88 
Joyner's approach tackles the gaps within the UN definition by presenting a framework 
that could be applied in different specific situations that also captures the different 
dimensions of impunity and its modes of operation. But an even more comprehensive 
approach is offered by J. Patrice McSherry and Raúl Molina Mejía where they set 
82 J. Patrice McSherry, Military Power, Impunity and State-Society Change in Latin America, 25:3 
Can. J. Polit. Sci. 463, 471 (1992).
83 C. Joyner, supra note 47, at 620.
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 616.
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 620. 
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three dimensions of impunity. First is the strategic impunity, defined as:
Active measures taken by state officials at specific moments, whether laws, decrees, 
amnesties, or pardons, to derail processes of or demands for truth and justice. Another 
manifestation of strategic impunity is a form of complicity between the civilian regime 
and the security forces, where civilian leaders publicly defend repressive measures or 
military forces that carry them out, repeat and legitimize army disinformation, or 
attack human rights advocates or those who demand accountability.89 
Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo who was elected in 1985, refused to repeal the 
Decree 8-86 granting amnesty to the military for past abuses; this is an example of 
strategic impunity.90 In response to the killings, disappearances and torture committed 
by the army in 1989, President Cerezo dismissed the documentation collected by 
human rights group.91 Another example is the appointment of General Jose Luis Quilo 
Ayuso, the former commander of a military zone where massive atrocities were 
committed by the army, as Minister of Defense.92 
Secondly, they define structural impunity as “mechanisms and structures, 
institutionalized and legalized in the state, that serve to protect a judicial system of 
military courts that protects those who abuse state power”.93 The authors use the 
examples of the use of military courts and the 1985 Guatemalan constitution which 
although sets a progressive set of liberal rights, it also provides the “legal basis for the 
national-security doctrine and ideology...[that] gives the army the role
of guaranteeing external and internal security and puts the entire state under the 
hegemony of the army.”94 Another example of structural impunity is the use of 
military trials for all matters involving military personnel. For example, if a civilian is 
involved in a car accident where the second party is a member of the military, then the 
military tribunal will have jurisdiction.95 The military tribunals in Guatemala serve to 
shield military personnel from any accountability.96 Military tribunals do not 
89 J. Patrice McSherry & Raúl Molina Mejía, Confronting the Question of Justice in Guatemala, 
19:3(49) Social Justice 1, 3 (1992).
90 Id. at 8. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 11.
93 Id. at 3. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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recognize international humanitarian laws or human rights laws.97 In the case of an 
American citizen found tortured and beheaded in Guatemala in 1990, military 
involvement was suspected, and after heavy U.S pressure on the civilian government, a 
military official was tried before a military court which not surprisingly freed him.98 
The third political/psychological dimension results “from state terror, by which 
political options in a polity are restricted and controlled through the state's 
manipulation of fear in the population; citizens' fear of state terror is exploited to 
maintain the status quo.”99 This type of impunity “serves to truncate the aspirations 
and possibilities imagined by the affected populations, thus shaping the political 
environment of a country...[and] to perpetuate the reign of terror and silence, 
preempting demands for greater social equality and justice.”100 An example of this 
dimension is illustrated by the Guatemalan experience through the Civil Patrol system 
where “virtually all men in the countryside (up to one million mostly indigenous 
males) have been forcibly recruited for unpaid duty for the army.”101 This system not 
only ensured the army's control over the population but it also forced its members to 
spy on their own Mayan communities by “keeping the “order” through intimidation 
and to perform unpaid labor on construction projects and road building to advance 
military counter insurgency projects.”102  
The approach offered by the authors tackles the gaps and ambiguities in the UN 
definition by providing a more comprehensive framework that goes beyond the scope 
of non-punishment. For example, the third dimension of psychological/political is not 
referred to at all in the UN definition. In addition, the classification of “de jure or de 
facto” of the UN definition remains too general and too simple. On the other hand, the 
distinction of structural/strategic is able to capture how these different dimensions of 
impunity can function. 
I will use the approach offered by Mc.Sherry and Mejía by identifying two dimensions 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 10. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 14.
101 Id. at 3. 
102 Id. 
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of impunity: strategic and structural. For the purpose of this paper, I will not use the 
third political/psychological dimension. Firstly, I will refer to strategic impunity as 
certain ad-hoc actions taken by the state in response to a specific development in a 
specific circumstance to derail processes of accountability or demands for truth and 
justice. Examples of strategic impunity include the decisions of the Prosecution to 
close investigations of human rights violations, the denial of human rights violations 
by the state, and the issuance of amnesty laws for former regime members.
Secondly, I will use the term structural impunity to refer to institutional traits of the 
Egyptian legal system such as laws, decrees, constitutions, the military judiciary, and 
the Public Prosecution. It is important to note that structural is distinguished from 
strategic as being an inherent trait of the system; not an ad-hoc decision taken by the 
state. For example, the decision by the state to try cases before military tribunals, 
which ultimately result in impunity for military personnel, will fall under structural; as 
the state is following the relevant provisions in Egyptian legislations prescribing it to 
do so in case of the involvement of a military party in the dispute. Thus the impunity 
here is a result of the laws that do not allow for trials of military personnel before 
civilian courts; i.e. an institutional trait of the system. 
Furthermore, I would like to stress that the distinction between structural and strategic 
is not legal vs. non-legal as strategic impunity is not necessarily an illegal action. For 
example, the issuance of amnesty laws for military ex-rulers is an example of strategic 
impunity as it is an ad-hoc action taken in response to a certain development, i.e. 
military rulers transferring power to a civilian government. On the other hand, the key 
distinction between these two dimensions is that one is a constant, inherit condition of 
the legal system (structural), while the other is an ad-hoc, varying element of the 
entire context of impunity (strategic). The reason I am stressing this distinction is 
because of the different implications they have for  understanding the causes of 
impunity. For example, the Egyptian Criminal Proceedings Code gives the Prosecution 
the exclusive discretion to close off investigations without an independent mechanism 
of appeal: this is an example of structural impunity. On the other hand, the decision by 
the Prosecution to close off the investigations is an example of strategic impunity. 
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The approach offered by Mc.Sherry and Mejía manages to address the difficulties of 
studying impunity by setting an analytical framework that identifies the multiple 
dimensions of impunity and also explains how these dimensions operate to produce 
impunity. I have chosen to use this approach in analyzing how the Egyptian legal 
system perpetuates impunity for several reasons. First, the approach identifies different 
multiple dimensions of impunity that are not restricted to institutional traits of the 
system such as legislations or the structure of the Prosecution, and other institutions. 
While these institutional features of the legal system play a very important role in 
contributing to impunity, they are not exclusively responsible for it. There are other 
factors that fall outside of the institutional scope of the legal system that not only allow 
but assist the perpetuation of impunity. The strategic dimension of impunity is able to 
capture such decisions by the state that are not necessarily inherent features of the 
legal system, but can result form the power relations in the state. 
For example, in examining why most torture complaints do not end in successful 
prosecutions, I can identify various reasons: the loopholes in the definition of torture 
in the Penal Code, the fact that the same police station in which the torture occurred is 
in charge of investigating the incident, the non-independence of the Forensics 
Department which could lead to an inaccurate forensic report, the exclusive discretion 
of the Prosecution to close off the investigation without adequate appeal recourses to 
the victims, the lack of will of the Prosecution to adequately investigate the complaint, 
and the probable decision of the Prosecution to close off the case after investigation. 
All of these reasons have different dimensions: some arise due to structural and 
institutional traits of the system, and others depend on the political will of these 
institutions and their decisions regarding each case. In order to capture all of these 
elements in a unified methodological framework, I must apply the framework of 
structural/strategic. The distinction between these two dimensions are quiet important 
as each have different implications and operate differently to result in the impunity.
Second, the two case studies I will examine exist in different legal systems: the civilian 
and military judiciary. These judiciaries have different structures and operate in quiet 
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different ways. Despite their differences, the structural/strategic framework enables 
me to capture their distinct features that contribute to the impunity. Thirdly, there are 
some incidents that can embody both dimensions of impunity.  Thus, this framework 
enables me to identify the interplay between the different dimensions of impunity and 
show how none of them exhaust the causes of impunity exclusively. In short, the 
structural/strategic framework enables me to identify and assess the different and 
varying features of the legal system, and other instances that fall outside of the legal 
system, and also examine how these features and instances operate in which way to 
produce impunity. 
I will apply this framework to two case studies, popularly referred to as Ramlat Boulaq 
and Maspero, in order to illustrate how the Egyptian legal system perpetuates 
impunity. I chose the case of Ramlat Boulaq to provide an example of the civilian 
judiciary, and the Maspero case as an example of the military judiciary. Through this 
analysis, I will highlight inherent traits of the Egyptian legal system that have 
contributed to the impunity as well as the lack of political will of the state to prosecute 
human rights violations, and accordingly show how this impunity is not an exceptional 
circumstance but is rather an institutionalized system that is a core pillar of the 
modern Egyptian state.         
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III. The Maspero Massacre
The first case study that I will use is that popularly known as Maspero. I first will 
review the facts of the incident that took place on October 9th 2011, and the legal 
proceedings that followed in the military and civilian courts. I also will present the 
reader with a brief overview of the military judiciary through an analysis of the Code 
of Military Justice (CMJ). Through the analysis of the legal proceedings and the CMJ, 
I will show how the legal system has perpetuated impunity whether via structural or 
strategic dimensions. 
A. What happened on October 9th 2011?
On October 9th 2011, the military police attacked a peaceful march of thousands of 
Coptic Christians who were protesting the demolition of Mar Girgis church in Aswan. 
The march started from Shoubra and ended in Maspero. The organizers of the protest 
informed the military in advance about the march and its planned route.  The Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) conducted an investigation into the events where 
they interviewed eye witnesses, injured protesters, and workers in the hospitals which 
received the injured protesters.103 The report found that the half hour between 6 and 
6:30 PM was the deadliest period which witnessed violations to the right to life and 
safety.104 The attacks of the military police developed from the use of sticks and firing 
gun shots in the air, to the military vehicles moving at a high speed, crushing the 
protesters, and ended with the use of live ammunition and tear gas.105
From that evening until the next morning, the streets surrounding Maspero witnessed 
chasing and searching on the basis of religious identity where Coptic Christians were 
attacked.106 In addition, at midnight, tens of Muslims went to the Coptic hospital which 
was filled with bodies of the victims and the injured that were still undergoing 
103
EIPR, al-aqb t tah a h km al- askar: waq i  m wa nisf min jar im al-marhalah al-intiq l yah,ā ̣ ṭ ụ ʻ āʼ ʻ ʻā ̣ āʼ ̣ ā ī  
Dec. 2012, available at http://eipr.org/report/2012/10/09/1520.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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treatment.107 A mob of Muslim men tried to storm the hospital and attacked cars and 
other private property around the hospital.108 One eye-witness told Amnesty 
International that “men in plain clothes [were] attacking Copts with knives and glass 
bottles around the Maspero area, as well as at the Coptic Hospital.”109 Relatives of 
those injured also told Amnesty International that they “were prevented from entering 
the Coptic Hospital by men in plain clothes who threatened to attack the hospital and 
visitors...other relatives said that the hospital was pelted with rocks by unidentified 
men in plain clothes, who also used tear gas near the area.”110
The report published by Amnesty International, which was based on various eye 
witness accounts found that “as numbers of protesters grew at Maspero, military 
police attempted to disperse them, using batons and firing what seemed initially as to 
be blank bullets in the air.”111 Tens of soldiers clashed with the protesters; they beat 
them violently with electric sticks and rods which led a number of youths coming 
from the march to throw stones at the soldiers.112 At this point there were some injuries 
in the lines of the protesters.113 As the violence escalated, the protesters persisted to 
reach the empty space near the State Television building (Maspero).114 Then, the 
military retreated to the back and the armored personnel carriers (APCs) started to 
move forward.115 Four APCs started to crush the protesters who then fled to either the 
fence surrounding the banks of the Nile, or entered into the surrounding buildings on 
the other side, or the surrounding near-by streets.116 
The Amnesty International report stated that “consistent testimonies by protesters, 
other witnesses and investigators, corroborated by video evidence, confirm that 
armored personnel carriers (APCs) and cars drove recklessly and at high speed into 
protesters in an attempt to disperse the demonstration”.117  The footage of the APCs 
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Amnesty International, supra note 7, at 12. 
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 EIPR, supra note 103. 
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117 Amnesty International, supra note 7, at 11. 
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running over protesters was caught on camera and broadcast on several local and 
international channels, as well as the Internet.118  The APCs crushed bodies of the 
victims several times, going back and forth, and neither the military police, the armed 
forces nor the Central Security Forces (CSF) gave the protesters a chance to carry the 
bodies of the dead from the ground.119 Military police and CSF attacked the bodies 
laying on the pavement as well as the injured protesters with sticks and rods.120 
According to eye-witness accounts, the military started to fire live ammunition 
simultaneously while the APCs stormed recklessly through the protesters.121 The gun 
fire came from different places; shots were fired from on top of the APCs, shots were 
fired by the military police situated at the front of the State Television building; and 
shots from unknown persons were fired from on top of the 6th of October bridge.122 
Some of the protesters “used stones and sticks in clashes with armed and security 
forces to try to stop the assaults...they also tried to stop the APCs by climbing on 
them.”123 Some of them then “attacked two unoccupied military vehicles parked by the 
Nile with wooden sticks and metal rods.”124 Another eye-witness told Human Rights 
Watch that the crowd “attacked another vehicle that came down the Corniche, lighting 
a gas canister under it and setting it aflame...two soldiers inside escaped...protesters 
beat one of them, who was rescued by a priest…[and] the other fled towards 
Maspero.”125  Then, civilians carrying guns and other weapons appeared standing near 
the military police.126 Civilians coming from the entrance of the side-streets clashed 
with the Coptic protesters near Ramses Hilton.127 One eye witness told Human Rights 
Watch that she encountered “a group of men in civilian clothing brandishing what she 
described as a sword and chanting anti-Christian slogans.”128
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State television had broadcast earlier the killing of three conscript soldiers by Coptic 
protesters, which was shown to be untrue later as forensic officials reported the death 
of only one soldier. One TV presenter called on the “honorable citizens to defend the 
army against the attack”. Hossam Bahgat, former director of EIPR, told Human Rights 
Watch that “a short time after the government channels broadcast the reports, he 
encountered groups of armed men in civilian clothes from the Boulaq neighborhood, 
next to Maspero, who said they had heard that armed Christians were attacking the 
army...[and] he witnessed attacks on Copts that evening by people in civilian 
clothes.”129  Downtown Cairo and the surrounding areas witnessed a hunt for Christians 
in the streets who were then attacked by live ammunition and other weapons.130 During 
that period from 9 PM until the next morning, these hunts and attacks were committed 
within the presence of the military police and the CSF. 131
The military police were able to disperse the protest and only a limited number of 
protesters remained hiding in the entrances of the surrounding buildings.132 The 
Military police conducted random arrests based on religious identity.133 They tortured 
the detainees inside the State Television building, by violent beatings. 28 were 
arrested; 25 of them were Coptic Christians.134 The detainees said that they were 
arrested in random areas by civilians, including from public transport.135
The Ministry of Health announced the death of 24 people; 14 were killed as a result of 
crushing by the APCs and 11 were killed by live ammunition.136 The Ministry 
announced that 329 were injured; some from live ammunition, others from the 
crushing of the APCs, and others suffered from broken bones as a result of attacks by 
sharp objects.137  According to forensic officials, one soldier was killed by a gunshot 
wound. 138 
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B. The Military's Response
On October 12th 2011, SCAF held a press conference about the Maspero massacre. 
During the press conference, the authorities “attempted to cover up the truth and 
blame the violence on protesters, sectarian tensions and “hidden elements”.”139 SCAF 
“dismissed criticism of its handling of the unrest as proof of the attempts to drive a 
wedge between the army and the people”.140  Generals Mahmoud Hegazy and Adel 
Emara denied any wrongdoing of the army, claimed that armed protesters are the ones 
who attacked the military, and that “the armed forces would never and have never 
opened fire on the people.”141
Despite the various footage showing the implication of the army in the massacre, the 
generals insisted that “the soldiers driving armored vehicles were trying to avoid 
protesters, who were throwing stones and Molotov cocktail bombs at them...[the 
soldiers] were in an unprecedented psychological state.”142 General Emara concluded 
that “I can’t deny that some people may have been hit, but it was not systematic.”143 
On October 27th 2011, the head of SCAF issued a communiqué stating that 
investigations of the Maspero massacre will be referred to the civilian judiciary, 
specifically the State Security Prosecution.144 Yet despite this announcement, the 
Maspero case was divided in to two sections; the case of the killing of the protesters 
by the APCs before the military court, and the case of the killing of protesters by live 
ammunition and other means before the civilian judiciary. Indeed, SCAF has resisted 
“calls by human rights organizations, victims’ families and the National Council for 
Human Rights to refer the entire investigation to an independent body empowered to 
compel members of the armed and security forces to testify.”145 
C. Dimensions of Impunity in the Maspero Case 
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The Maspero case was first referred to the State Security Courts, which referred it to 
an investigative judge from the Ministry of Justice, Counseller Tharwat Hamad.146 On 
April 24th 2012, the civilian judge decided to shelve the investigations with the 54 
defendants, which included activists, members of the State Television and Coptic 
priests. Alaa Abdel Fattah, the well-known human rights defender and blogger, was 
arrested by the military on October 30th 2011 on charges of inciting violence against 
the military.147 The 54-list also included Mina Daniel, a young activist who was shot 
dead by the military police in the Maspero massacre.148 At least 30 people were 
detained under these investigations; the charges included “stealing weapons and 
engaging in arson or other disorderly behavior.”149  Eventually, the case was closed as 
the judge stated that there was not enough evidence. He then dropped the charges, and 
mandated the police to continue investigations to strengthen the evidence. Then, the 
Public Prosecution appealed this decision, however in May 2013, the Court of Appeals 
found that there is no basis to re open the case, and accordingly supported the earlier 
decision by the investigative judge.150
Though, the investigative judge referred two Coptic protesters, Maikal Adel Naguib, 
and Maikal Mosaad Shaker, to the criminal court on charges of stealing and 
possession of firearms that belonged to the military.151 On February 4th 2012, a North 
Cairo Criminal Court sentenced them to three years imprisonment.152 During the 
Court's examination of this case (No. 2121 of 2011 in Bolaq Abu al-Ela), it affirmed 
that it will only look at the incident of theft of the military's weapons without 
examining the context of the theft.153 
The second part of the proceedings were conducted before the military judiciary 
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where the military prosecution referred case No. 5447 of 2011 to court. The military 
court charged three soldiers with manslaughter according to article 238 (a) of the 
Penal Code.154 The Military Court started the trial on December 27th 2011.155
1. Structural Impunity
I have defined structural impunity as inherent features of the legal system such as 
legislations, constitutions, and structures of the judiciary. In the Maspero case, the 
referral of the three soldiers to a military court constitutes structural impunity for two 
reasons. First, the current structure of the military judiciary leaves it with little 
independence from the executive. Second, the Code of Military Justice (CMJ) 
prescribes exclusive jurisdiction to all disputes involving military personnel.  
First, although the 2012 suspended Constitution and the 8th of July 2013 
Constitutional Declaration consider the military judiciary as an independent body, the 
structure of this institution proves to be otherwise.156 The CMJ explicitly states that the 
military judiciary is an organ of the armed forces157 where its head is a subordinate of 
the Minister of Defense;158 all its members must be members of the armed forces159 
and are appointed by the President after conferring with the Minister of Defense. The 
reader can realize that there is an underlying problem of independence. The military 
154 Id. Art. 238(a) states that whoever causes the death of someone as a result of his negligence, or 
recklessness, or his non-compliance with the laws, decisions and regulations, shall be punished by 
no less than six months imprisonment and a fine of no more than 200 EGP, or either penalties. The 
penalty for imprisonment  shall be no less than one year and no more than five years and the fine no 
less than 100 EGP and no more than 500 EGP, or either penalties, if the crime occurred as a result 
of the offender's grave breach of his profession, or as a result of his intoxication when he committed 
the crime resulting in the incident, or if during the incident he did not help the victim. Law No. 58 
of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), al-Jar dah al-rasm yahī ī  (Egypt).
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157 Art. 1, Law No. 25 of 1966 (Code of Military Justice), al-Jar dah al-rasm yahī ī  (Egypt).
158 Id. at art. 2. 
159 Id. at art. 55.
29
prosecution and the military courts are not independent entities but are rather sub-
organs of the military institution. Furthermore, members of the military prosecution, 
including military judges, must possess a high-ranking status in the military. This 
presents another serious problem where the members of the military judiciary are 
appointed based on hierarchy, and not experience or competence. It also presents 
another problem of impartiality where as the members of the military judiciary come 
from the same military family and can often have personal ties or sympathies with 
their colleagues on trial.160 In addition, members of the military judiciary are subject to 
the orders of their superiors where they cannot ignore such orders, or else they could 
themselves face trial. 
It is important to refer here to the UN Basic Principles of the Independence of the 
Judiciary where it states that:
It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the 
independence of the judiciary...[and the judiciary] shall decide matters before them 
impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any 
restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, 
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.161 
By default of its structure, the military judiciary does not confirm with the standards 
set forth by the UN principles. The fact that members of the military judiciary are 
subordinates of the executive makes the entire institution more of an organ of the state, 
rather than an independent judicial body. 
Furthermore, the interference of the executive in the legal process of the military 
judiciary is also highlighted by its system of ratification of sentences. All sentences by 
the military courts must be ratified by the President or the officer the President 
mandates, to enter into force.162 If the sentence has been ratified, then it cannot be 
appealed, except in cases of the death penalty or with the knowledge of the President 
160 Macovei, supra note 76 , at 114. 
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or whom he mandates.163 When examining the appeal, the superior of the “ratification 
officer”164 has the complete discretion to cancel the sentence, order a re-trial, mediate 
or suspend the sentence.165  In an independent judicial system, judicial decisions 
“cannot be subject to change by authorities other than superior courts.”166 This is 
affirmed by the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary which state 
that “there shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial 
process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision.”167 
The above discussion of the structure of the military judiciary shows how it is not an 
independent judicial body, but rather a sub-organ of the executive. Thus, the use of the 
military court to try the three soldiers is an example of the structural dimension of 
impunity, as it is due to the inherent structure of the military judiciary. By using the 
military judiciary to prosecute human rights violations committed by a branch of the 
executive (military personnel), the result will most likely be impunity because the 
same body that committed the violations is in charge of investigating itself. 
Second, the referral of the three soldiers to the military courts is due to the provisions 
of the CMJ where it states that the military courts have jurisdiction over all members 
of the armed forces, including students at military universities or schools, and 
employees of the Ministry of Defense,168 as well as crimes that occur in areas managed 
by the armed forces.169 However, the jurisprudence of international and regional human 
rights mechanisms have affirmed that incidents involving serious human rights 
violations should not be tried before a military court,170 as it undermines essential 
163 Id. at art. 102.
164 The “ratification officer” is the officers mandated by the President to ratify sentences, Id. at art. 97.
165 Id. at art. 99, 112, 116. The articles do not provide any detailed descriptions on what the officer can 
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safeguards that could eventually determine the outcome of the trial. The fact that the 
investigation for the Maspero massacre was carried out by the military prosecution 
“casts serious doubt over its impartiality and independence.”171 The military trial “is 
depraved of the minimal guarantees of justice and constitutes a continuation of 
SCAF's position of refusing to admit any responsibility for this horrific crime 
[Maspero].”172 The military prosecution’s investigation into the case is a “part of the 
[same] military institution that the injured protesters have accused it of murder and so 
it cannot be considered an unbiased party in this [present] case.”173  Egyptian human 
rights organizations have blamed SCAF for “continuing to shield members of the 
military police from criminal prosecution by referring three soldiers to a military trial 
before the investigative judge mandated by the Public Prosecution finished his 
investigations into the incident.”174  These serious concerns over the impartiality and 
integrity of the military trial are well in place. 
Thus, the trial of the three soldiers before the military court is an element of structural 
impunity as it is due to an inherent trait of the legal system, i.e. the CMJ's exclusive 
jurisdiction over all crimes committed by the military. By exclusively prescribing 
jurisdiction to the military courts, the CMJ prevents trials of military personnel before 
the civilian judiciary. In light of the non-independence and bias of the military court 
as discussed above, the outcome of military trials for military abuses will most likely 
result in impunity.  Furthermore, given the entrenchment of the military in Egyptian 
politics, this law further supports the military's existence as a state within a state, 
above the law, governed by their own rules, on their own terms. 
aside in favor of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to conduct inquiries into serious human 
rights violations such as extra-judicial executions, enforced disappearances and torture, and to 
prosecute and try persons accused of such crimes.”; The Human Rights Committee, the Committee 
against Torture, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights and the country-specific and thematic procedures of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, have reached an unanimous position: “military tribunals are not 
competent to try military personnel responsible for serious human rights violations against 
civilians.” Id.
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On April 11th 2012, EIPR, al-Nadim Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of 
Violence and lawyers of the families of the victims decided to withdraw from the 
proceedings before the military court.  In their joint statement, the organizations stated 
that “after 12 hearings, the military judiciary has proved once again to not be 
concerned with achieving justice.”175 The organizations noted that they found out about 
the proceedings by surprise when the head of the military judiciary issued a statement 
on December 20th 2011 stating that the case of Maspero and the virginity tests are 
currently being processed before the military courts.176 As the organizations were 
presenting the families of the victims, as civil parties to the case, the law does not 
guarantee that they are informed about the proceedings.177 The Court of Appeal has 
upheld in several cases that once a military court has issued its final verdict, the victim 
can file a civil suit for reparation before civilian courts.178 The military and civilian 
courts work simultaneously in this regard where as the victims and civil parties are not 
guaranteed a presence in the military court's proceedings, however the civilians courts 
can then step in to provide the victims with civil reparations. These simultaneous roles 
can be used as a justification by the authorities to maintain the use of military courts; 
they can argue that while victims cannot find their place in the military courts, they 
will find it in the civilian courts. However, there are several loopholes within this 
system that prevent the victims from truly engaging in the legal process. 
First, the lawyers of the victims were not allowed to access the investigation papers, as 
well as other documents in the prosecution file.179 This decision comes in blatant 
violation of the principle of equality of arms enshrined in international human rights 
standards.180 Article 67 of the CMJ states that all parties to the case have the right to 
access all the files of the cases, with the exception of confidential files.181 While this 
175 See Press Release, EIPR, nsi b al-munaz m t al-h q q yah wa usar shuhad  m sb r  min ī ḥā ẓạ ā ụ ū ī āʼ ā ī ū
am m al-mahk mah al- askar yahā ạ ʻ ī , Apr. 11, 2011, available at 
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it states that the courts are obliged to inform the defendants and witnesses of the proceedings. It 
does not mention the civil parties or victims. 
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33
point can be valid in cases where the crimes are strictly involving the armed forces and 
military matters, it can be very problematic for crimes that involve civilians, in 
particularly human rights violations committed by the military. Indeed, this is what 
happened in this case where the lawyers of the families of the victims were not 
allowed to access to several documents. Hence, Article 67 of the CMJ is an element of 
structural impunity as it is an inherent trait prescribed in the legal system. This 
provision can be used to prevent victims' lawyers from accessing important files, thus 
severely restricting victims' participation in the proceedings. This restriction can affect 
the victims' plea in the case which can ultimately determine the verdict against the 
perpetrators. 
Secondly, while the military judiciary is obliged to examine all the evidence submitted 
to it by the military prosecution and defendants, this does not mean that the judges are 
obliged to look into evidence submitted by the civil parties (the victims' lawyers).182 
Thirdly, the military judiciary is not obliged to listen to the requests of the civil 
parties; it can even refuse to allow them to attend the hearings.183 These are elements of 
structural impunity as they are due to inherent features of the legal system, i.e. the 
limited rights civil parties have in proceedings before the military courts. These 
elements of structural impunity have allowed the judges to refuse to examine evidence 
submitted by the victims' lawyers which contained incriminating material, not only 
against the soldiers, but also against their superiors. Furthermore, the lack of 
obligation of the military judge to examine the requests by the civil parties which 
included requests to change the charges from misdemeanor to crime, and including 
high-ranking military officials in the list of defendants, have contributed to the 
impunity. The three year imprisonment sentence against the three soldiers is not 
proportionate to the gravity of the crime. In addition, it has exonerated all their 
superiors who gave the orders from any punishment. 
Furthermore, I believe that victims should be able to engage in the criminal part of the 
proceedings; restricting their role to only applying for monetary compensation is 
neither appropriate nor fair. The right to effective remedy is not limited to monetary 
182 Interview with Ishak Ibrahim, Head of the Sectarian Violence in EIPR, in Cairo (Nov. 12, 2013).
183 Id.
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compensation, but also includes the right to establish the truth, and the right to testify 
and engage in the judicial criminal proceedings.184 
Moreover, the organizations noted the grave conflict in the case as it was processed by 
two judiciaries; the civilian investigative judge and the military judiciary. There should 
be only one body investigating the case in order to be able to identify the actual 
perpetrators of the crime and punish them. The decision by the authorities to process 
two parallel legal proceedings presents both structural and strategic examples of 
impunity. First, the element of structural impunity is primarily related to the fact that 
the civilian judiciary, even if it wanted to, is unable to prosecute military personnel for 
crimes committed against civilians. This was supported by the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Appeal where it has ruled that civilians courts have no jurisdiction to try 
cases that were processed before a military court; nor can it rule on cases involving the 
jurisdiction of the military courts.185 
2. Strategic Impunity
Second, I have defined strategic impunity as ad-hoc actions taken by the state in 
response to a specific development in a specific circumstance to derail a process of 
accountability or demands for truth and justice.  Examples of strategic impunity 
include the affirmation and legitimization of army disinformation, discrediting of 
information documented by human rights groups and attacks against human rights 
advocates or those who demand accountability. I believe that the decision to separate 
the cases according to the causes of death presents an example of strategic impunity as 
it is an ad-hoc decision taken by the state to affirm and legitimize army 
misinformation. The official narrative presented by SCAF is that the military did not 
intentionally kill the protesters, but rather the three soldiers drove recklessly which 
resulted in their collision with the protesters, thus killing them, by accident. On the 
other hand, the other causes of death such as live ammunition was referred to the 
civilian judiciary. The investigations that were presented by the Military Police and the 
184 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005) available at 
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State Security aimed at accusing the protesters of killing each other and attacking the 
military, rather than the military firing live ammunition at the protesters. By putting 
these two facts together, the reader will realize that the decision by the authorities to 
divide the cases in this regard, does indeed support the scenario that was presented by 
SCAF during the press conference (that they did not open fire on the protesters). In 
sum, the decision to separate the cases according to the cause of death is an example 
of strategic impunity as it not only affirmed the denial of atrocities by SCAF, but also 
prevented the families of the victims who died from live ammunition and other causes, 
from prosecuting the military officers responsible for their deaths. 
Furthermore, I would like to draw the reader's attention to the fact that the entire 
proceedings before the civilian judiciary was aimed at one thing: prosecuting the 
protesters, and blaming them for the violence, instead of identifying the real 
perpetrators and holding them accountable. I can support my claim by the following 
reasons. First, the investigative judge decided to close the case against the 54 
defendants because the investigations failed to identify the real perpetrates of the 
crime, failed to identify the type of weapons that killed the victims, and that there 
were no evidence to suggest that the suspects that were presented by the investigations 
of the Military Police and State Security, have participated or incited others who 
participated in the crime.186 Second, Wael Sabry Bshay, whose brother was killed in 
the events, told Amnesty International that he was asked to testify before the civilian 
and military judiciaries.187 He reported that “he was asked questions they knew he 
would not be able to answer, and complained that the military prosecutor intimidated 
witnesses, including by accusing them of “seeking to invade the [Maspero] building” 
and by “screaming at them”.”188 Amnesty International reported other similar 
complaints by other witnesses and relatives of those killed, including that “the military 
prosecution’s demeanor and types of questions shook their faith in the independence 
and impartiality of the investigation, and left them feeling like the accused rather than 
the victims.””189 
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I would like to add that this method of prosecuting victims and protesters instead of 
the real perpetrators is not a unique or individual case. Since the Revolution, the 
Public Prosecution and the courts have embarked on this methodology and continue to 
use it until this very day. These are demonstrations of strategic impunity as they are 
active measures taken by the state to deny human rights violations committed by its 
apparatus, attack those who demand accountability and derail the demands for truth 
and justice. This approach has been used excessively by the Egyptian legal institutions, 
where as the institutions responsible for investigating and prosecuting human rights 
violations have focused on exonerating the perpetrators of any punishment and instead 
punishing the victims. 
Moreover, the adoption of this narrative was supported by the military judiciary's 
approach in dealing with the case. First, the organizations observed that the military 
court focused on discrediting the content of any evidence submitted by the victims' 
lawyers.190 Secondly, they also noted that the military judiciary kept postponing the 
decision of the requests to modify the charges from the misdemeanor of manslaughter 
to premeditated murder.191 Thirdly, the court overlooked the requests of the lawyers to 
include suspects other than the three soldiers in to the trial for their responsibility in 
the killings of the protesters.192 Fourthly, the investigations conducted by the military 
prosecution as well as the civilian judiciary revolve around one purpose and that is to 
find a way to condemn the protesters.193 These are all examples of strategic impunity 
as they are ad-hoc actions taken by the judges to discredit information documented by 
human rights groups, and affirm the army's official narrative. The discrediting of the 
evidence submitted by the victims' lawyers, the refusal to include the soldiers' 
superiors in the list of defendants, and maintaining that the crime was a misdemeanor 
and not premeditated murder affirms the army's scenario that the soldiers were not 
acting out of orders, but rather acted recklessly due to their “unprecedented 
psychological state”.  In addition, by focusing on blaming the protesters for the 
violence, the judges have affirmed the military's scenario that the protesters were the 
ones who attacked the army. In sum, the military judiciary's actions ensured that the 
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official narrative is upheld, and that the high-ranking military officers who gave the 
orders are not incriminated in the case, thus resulting in their impunity. 
The organizations finally withdrew stating that they felt that continuing to work in this 
direction, amidst the obvious bias of the military judiciary, will only lead to adding 
legitimacy to a trial that wastes away the rights of the victims.194   EIPR stated that the 
main purpose of this trial was to “affirm the scenario presented by SCAF about the 
massacre in the press conference held on October 12th 2011, where they denied that 
any of soldiers charged with securing the [State] Television building were armed, and 
it considered that the protesters are the ones who attacked the military police, and the 
drivers of the military vehicles were struck by confusion so they crushed the 
protesters.”195  Amnesty International reached a similar conclusion where it stated that 
the military courts have been “unwilling to provide justice in cases where people have 
been killed, injured or tortured by members of the armed forces, even in prominent 
cases where the victim or their family was able to bring a member of the army to 
trial.”196  Indeed, as the reader reviews the course of both proceedings before the 
military and civilian courts, s/he can conclude that the purpose of the trial was not 
only to condemn the protesters but also focus on affirming the official narrative that 
the military was not responsible for the deaths, but rather that the three soldiers acted 
recklessly, and without orders from their superiors. 
The reader will then not be surprised to read that on September 2nd 2012, the East 
Military Misdemeanor Court sentenced the soldiers Mahmoud Sayed Abdel Hamid 
Soliman, 27 years old, Karam Hamed Mohamed Hamed, 27 years old, to two years 
imprisonment, and the soldier Mahmoud Gamal Taha Mahmoud, 22 years old, to three 
years imprisonment on charges of manslaughter. 197 The court ruled that the three 
soldiers “caused the death of 14 people in front of the State Television building, by 
mistake, as a result of their neglect while driving the military armored personnel 
carriers, which they drove in a random manner that was not appropriate to the roads 
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crowded with people, which resulted in their collision with the victims”.198 Several 
relatives of those killed in Maspero “received compensation of 30,000 Egyptian 
pounds (around US$5,000), but have not been provided with any other form of 
reparation.”199 It is important to note that this compensation came in light of the 
decision to include the victims of the Maspero massacre as part of the “martyrs of the 
Revolution”, and thus benefiting from the fund set up to provide them with monetary 
compensation.
In addition, former President Mohamed Morsy issued a presidential decree 
establishing a fact-finding commission mandated to “collect information, evidence and 
conduct fact-finding in the incidents of attempted murder, murder and injury of 
protesters between the period of 25 January 2011 until 30 June 2012; in order to collect 
the full facts regarding the perpetrators, whether they were direct or indirect 
perpetrators.”200 The Maspero massacre was included in the list of incidents that the 
commission investigated. The commission finalized its report and submitted to the 
President and the Public Prosecution in January 2013. At the time of writing, the 
Prosecution has not started any investigations into this case. The decision by the 
Prosecution to not re-open its investigation is an example of strategic impunity as it is 
an ad-hoc decision taken to prevent any punishment of the military for the Maspero 
massacre. It is important to recall that the investigations of the civilian judge were 
closed due to lack of evidence. Hence, the fact-finding report could have been used by 
the Prosecution as additional evidence to re-open the case. However, the Prosecution 
refrained from using the report and has consequently assured that incriminating 
evidence against the military will not be used to prosecute and eventually punish the 
perpetrators of this massacre.
Finally, the former President even honored former head of SCAF, Field Marshal 
Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, and former chief of Army Staff, Sami Enan in August 
2012 after their forced retirement. These two men, by virtue of their posts, have 
engaged in superior responsibility for the grave human rights violations committed by 
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their subordinates. Yet, Morsy followed in the same paths as his Latin American 
counterparts, and embarked on that same strategy of awarding former military heads 
rather than punishing them for the atrocities they managed. The rewarding of SCAF 
members is an example of strategic impunity as it is an ad-hoc decision taken to 
affirm the denial of human rights violations committed under their rule. This decision 
supports the narrative of SCAF that they have never opened fire on protesters, and 
accordingly has contributed to their lack of punishment for all human rights violations 
committed during their reign. 
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IV. Ramlat Boulaq
In this chapter I will discuss the second case of Ramlat Boulaq. I first will provide a 
brief background about this area and then review the facts of the incident that took 
place on August 2nd 2012 and the legal proceedings that followed in the civilian 
courts.  I will show how the legal system has perpetuated impunity through these 
proceedings, whether via structural or strategic dimensions of impunity. I will use the 
information provided by the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights 
(ECESR) and EIPR, who both conducted an investigation based on eye witness 
accounts from the residents of Ramlat Boulaq regarding the killing of Amr al-Bunni 
by the tourism police. 
A. Historical Background
Eshash al-Kafrawi is a slum area in Ramlat Boulaq Abu al-Ela on the banks of the 
Nile Corniche in Cairo.  According to official papers released by the Slum 
Development Fund, the area is referred to as “Ramlat Boulaq Nile Towers”.201 In the 
1990s, Orascom Company purchased land form the owners in order to build the Nile 
City Towers and the Fairmont hotel.202 On one side lies the fancy hotel and mall which 
hosts a number of offices of multinational corporations, and on the other side lies one 
of the poorest slums in Cairo, Eshash al-Kafrawi, where around 3000 residents live 
without access to water or sewage.203 Most of the families there live all together in one 
or two rooms, in homes that are partly demolished, where they have no proper waste 
management or access to basic services.204 
Since the 1990s, the residents of this area have been facing harassment by security 
forces and attempts to forcibly evict them from their lands as part of the alleged plan 
to develop this area.205 However, there was no clear information about these plans of 
development nor was there information available about the compensation given to the 
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families who had been forcibly evicted.206 On June 20th 2012, Abdel Qaqi Khalifa, the 
Cairo governor, issued a decision ordering the governorate’s seizure of the property of 
the slums of “Nile Towers” in Boulaq for a period of three years.207 EIPR and ECESR 
filed a lawsuit against this decision before the Administrative Court and on August 
28th 2013, the Court ruled against the government decision and banned the 
government order of land acquisition and eviction of the residents.208
The interaction between the residents of Eshash al-Kafrawi and the management of the 
Nile Towers began with the start of the Revolution in 2011. On January 28th 2011, 
residents of the area volunteered to counter the attempts of assault and looting of the 
towers, after the near-by Arcadia mall was looted and destroyed.209  Amr al-Dalli, the 
director of security of the towers, praised the residents' efforts and asked some of them 
to cooperate with him in protecting the towers in return for a monthly monetary 
compensation.210 This agreement was customary and not done in an official written 
contract however EIPR was able to collect copies of the cards that the hotel issued for 
the residents in charge of security.211 This cooperation continued since then until the 
events of August 2nd 2012. 
B. The Ramlat Boulaq Protests
The events started when the management of the Fairmont hotel stopped paying the 
monthly monetary compensation to some of the residents that were assigned to protect 
the towers, and then the consequent killing of Amr al-Bunni and the injury of others. 
There are two scenarios to what happened that day: the scenario of the residents and 
the official scenario announced by the Ministry of Interior. 
According to the residents' account, Amr al-Bunni went to the Fairmont hotel to 
collect his monthly fee for securing the towers and the hotel. Then, the security of the 
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hotel and the tourism police refused to allow him entry into the building; as per the 
orders of the new security director of the hotel who ordered the halt to the payments.212 
A quarrel emerged between al-Bunni, the security of the hotel and the police which 
escalated into a fight where a police officer fired gun shots at al-Bunni’s thigh and 
another shot to his back, killing him.213  Eye witnesses confirmed that al-Bunni was 
not armed when he went to the hotel to collect his monthly fee.214 The testimonies also 
confirmed that the police officer shot al-Bunni in the leg at first, which was enough to 
keep him paralyzed and thus disperse the threat he allegedly posed.215 But then he shot 
him again in his back which led to his death.216  
The testimonies showed that one of the residents, Anwar Ramadan, was the first 
person to arrive at the hotel after al-Bunni was shot.217 He carried his body to the 
ambulance outside the building but the paramedics informed him that al-Bunni has 
already died and they advised him to return the body to the same place where he found 
it, until the Prosecution arrives.218 When Ramadan returned to the hotel carrying the 
body of al-Bunni, a quarrel occurred between him and the same police officer that 
shot al-Bunni, where the latter shot Ramadan in his leg.219  Ramadan told EIPR that he 
called his son to come and take him to a hospital, however upon his son's arrival, his 
son was also shot in his leg by the police.220  
After news spread about the death of al-Bunni, the injury of Ramadan and his son at 
the hands of the police, a number of residents gathered around the hotel, breaking its 
front and setting fire to a number of cars in the vicinity of the Nile Corniche.221  Police 
forces from Boulaq police station and CSF confronted the attacks and the clashes 
ended at around 8 PM that day.222  
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According to the scenario offered by the Ministry of Interior, a group of thugs stormed 
the Fairmont hotel demanding a fee.223 When the employees of the hotel refused, they 
attacked them with weapons (including bird-shot pellets).224 When the police officer 
tried to force them to leave, they attacked him and tried to steal his weapon.225 Clashes 
erupted between them, forcing the police officer to use his weapon in self-defense 
where he fired one gun shot at his [al-Bunni] abdomen, killing him.226 The person 
killed turned out to be Omar Fathi Amer, also known as Amr al-Bunni, who is a 
registered offender in various cases involving drugs and car theft.227 He was previously 
detained and released in July 2012.228 
The events concluded with the death of one person, the injury of three persons by gun 
shots and tens of persons by other means.229 There were no injuries or deaths of any 
police officer, and the damages of the hotel and the towers amounted to seven million 
Egyptian pounds.230
On August 8th 2012, security forces raided Eshash al-Kafrawi where they stormed all 
the houses in the area, destroyed its contents, intimidated the residents and randomly 
arrested most of the males.231 The raid continued from 4 AM until 8 AM.232 Police 
forces returned and raided the area in the evening, using the same violence and 
random manner of arrests.233  The number of arrested residents reached around 75 
people that day.234 The police released most of those arrested on the same day with the 
exception of 10 persons who had arrest warrants issued against them.235 Those who 
were released reported that they were severely beaten by the police during their 
detention.236
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EIPR assessed the area that same evening and found that the police intended to destroy 
all the doors and contents of the houses.237 The residents reported that the police 
officers conducting the raids were all masked so they were unable to identify them.238  
The police forces attacked the men and women without discrimination, beating and 
insulting them.239 Some residents even reported that some of their belongings were 
stolen during the raids.240 Some families left their houses and went to stay with their 
relatives as they were afraid that their male family members will get arrested.241 Most 
of those who remained in the area were children and women whereas most of the men 
had been arrested or fled their homes.242  There were also reports of the police 
arresting women from the area as hostages so that they force their relatives to 
surrender themselves to the police.243
EIPR met with Abdullah Anwar, the brother and son of the two who were injured by 
gun shots by the police.244  He reported that he was arrested on August 3rd while 
walking in the street.245 He was tortured, severely beaten and four of his front teeth 
were broken by the police officer, Mohamed al-Qosi during his two day detention in 
Boulaq police station.246  His mother took the boy to the Forensics Department, with 
the front teeth her son lost, in order to prove his injury.247 The forensic report 
confirmed Anwar's claims.248
Over all, EIPR's investigations documented a number human rights violations against 
the residents including premeditated murder, excessive use of force, live ammunition 
and tear gas, violent raids against the residents' houses including intimidation and 
damaging of their belongings, random arrests and torture of those arrested during 
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detention, including against children.249   
C. The Multiple Dimensions of Impunity in the Ramlat Boulaq Case
As this case was widely covered by the media, the Prosecution rushed to the scene of 
the incident and started its investigations, examined all the suspects and took the 
testimonies of the victims and ordered their examination by the Forensics 
Department.250 However, the result was, as usual: impunity for police officers and the 
accusation of the victims and their referral to trial. None of the police officers were 
referred to trial for the murder, injury and torture of the victims despite the charges 
against them supported by the forensic reports. On the other hand, 51 of the residents 
are now facing a criminal trial. 
On October 9th 2013, the Prosecution finished its investigation and decided to refer 51 
suspects from the residents of Ramlat Boulaq to a criminal trial on charges of murder, 
endangering the safety of public transportation, disrupting traffic, using violence 
against public employees and possession of weapons.251 17 people were arrested and 
were presented before the Prosecution on August 3rd 2012.252 They were charged with 
possession of non-firearm weapons, disrupting traffic, damaging touristic properties, 
thuggery, resisting the authorities, and using violence against the Fairmont hotel 
employees.253 The Prosecution also pressed charges of possession of bird shot fire 
arms against one of the suspects.254  The Prosecution ordered the detention of 16 
persons for 4 days in case No. 3842 of 2012.255 On August 5th, the Prosecution 
renewed the detention of all suspects for 15 days.256 At the time of writing, they remain 
in detention. The Prosecution also ordered the arrest of another 21 persons on charges 
of use of force and violence against the employees of the hotel and security forces 
assigned for its protection, and use of force against government employees from the 
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police force. 257
Yasser Ali (the police officer who killed al-Bunni) had claimed that the incident was a 
fight between the designated police officer for the hotel and the victim, and that the 
bullet came out of his weapon by mistake during his attempt to break up the fight.258  
Ali’s forensic report stated that the injuries he sustained in his left forearm, neck and 
chest are a result of his friction with a sharp body or rough surface.259  On September 
11, the forensic report of al-Bunni confirmed that the scenario offered by Ali was 
untrue.260 The report concluded that the deceased suffered from injuries in the back 
and abdomen as a result of gun shots. The report also confirmed that the deceased was 
not fighting with the police officer at the time and the latter shot him in the back 
intentionally killing him.261 On August 3rd, the Prosecution charged Ali with the 
murder of al-Bunni stating that he used his police weapon to fire at the victim, 
intending to kill him.262 It also charged him with the injury of Anwar Ramadan.263 In 
the investigations of the case, the Prosecution went through the recordings of the hotel 
cameras which showed that Ali killed al-Bunni.264 The recordings showed that al-
Bunni was not armed in any way which denies Ali’s claim of self-defense.265 
On August 3rd 2012, during the interrogation of Walid Hassan, one of the arrested 
residents, he accused the police officer Hisham Etman of firing gun shots at him and 
injuring him.266  The Prosecution then mandated the following day a forensic doctor to 
examine Hassan to prove his injuries, and explain its cause.267  On August 3rd 2012, 
the Prosecution interrogated Etman and charged him with attempted murder of 
Hassan, stating that he fired gun shots injuring the victim in his thigh.268  The forensic 
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report stated that the testimony of the victim is plausible thus supporting the charges 
against Etman.269  Furthermore, the camera footage processed by the Prosecution 
showed that Etman used excessive force against the residents, which supports their 
testimonies.270  
The head of the Prosecution ordered the copying of the files of the cases against the 
police officers and its referral to the Public Prosecutor. These files included the 
charges against Ali for the killing of al-Bunni, and the injury of Anwar Ramadan 
Abdel Latif; the torture of Abdullah Anwar Ramadan by Mohmed al-Qosi; the injury 
of Hassan by Etman; and another incident of the injury of 5 citizens by gun shots from 
police officers.271  The ‘order of copying the files’ procedurally means that each 
incident will be referred under a new case number that shall be investigated, and 
eventually the decision will be made whether to shelve the case of refer it to trial.272  
One film processed by the Prosecution showed Ali stepping on al-Bunni's body.273 This 
evidence was sufficient for the Prosecution to charge Ali in the first case; however it 
ordered the copying of the files which allowed for the police to tamper with the 
evidence.274 When the evidence was re-processed, it had become damaged.275  The 
judges decided to shelve the case of Ali for the murder of al-Bunni, and the case of 
Etman for the attempted murder of Hassan, claiming that there were no reasons to 
institute proceedings.276 The Prosecution also investigated the case of violent raids 
against the residents’ houses by the police; however it did not refer any of the police 
officers to trial.277
1. Structural impunity
I have defined previously structural impunity as inherent features of the legal system 
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such as legislations and the structure of the Public Prosecution. When the Prosecution 
re-processed the evidence against Ali, it found that it was damaged. This incident 
sheds light on a crucial problem in the legal system: the fact that police officers are in 
charge of providing the Prosecution with investigations of police crimes. This feature 
is an element of structural impunity as it is an inherent feature of the legal system. 
This structural dimension of impunity presents a severe conflict of interest that has 
contributed to impunity for police abuses for two primary reasons. First, it allows the 
police to refrain from collecting evidence, knowing that there will probably be no 
cross-examination of their police reports. Second, it allows for the police to pressure 
the victims and witnesses, and damage evidence that incriminates their colleagues (as 
in the present case). 
Furthermore, this conflict of interest arises from “placing the responsibility to monitor 
detention facilities, order forensic exams, and investigate and prosecute abuses by law 
enforcement officials within the same office that is responsible for ordering arrests, 
obtaining confessions, and prosecuting criminal suspects.”278 A former prosecutor told 
Human Rights Watch that:
The other problem is that the Public Prosecution does not do the investigations itself, it 
relies on the police. It’s not the prosecutor’s job to look for the evidence, unless they 
take a personal interest in it. The prosecutor is usually much too overloaded to 
question the evidence presented by the police. It’s the police that bring the witnesses 
and the evidence. So if I order the police to go and summon a witness and they come 
back saying they couldn’t find him or he no longer lives there, there’s not much I can 
do about  it. Plus they can always tamper with the evidence or pressure witnesses to 
change their testimony.279 
This crucial and honest testimony sheds light upon the critical dilemma of having the 
police investigate themselves. Given the malignant corruption present inside the 
Egyptian police, one cannot expect that they will conduct investigations against their 
colleagues with integrity.  The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has acknowledged 
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this problem and stated that “the conflict of interest inherent in having the same 
institutions responsible for the investigation and prosecution of ordinary law-breaking 
being also responsible for the same functions in respect of law-breaking by members 
of those very institutions.”280 Moreover, the Committee against Torture made a specific 
recommendation to Egypt regarding this matter. The Committee recommended that 
the government “set up an independent investigation machinery, including in its 
composition judges, lawyers and medical doctors that should efficiently examine all 
the allegations of torture, in order to bring them expeditiously before the courts.”281 
This recommendation was issued in 1999 and to this date the Egyptian authorities are 
yet to implement it.  
Another crucial issue in the legal system is the lack of independence of the Public 
Prosecution.282 This is an element of structural impunity because its due to the inherent 
features in the structure of the Prosecution. The head of the Prosecution is appointed 
by the President, who then can appoint other members of the Prosecution who are 
formally supervised by the Ministry of Justice.283 This current structure of 
“investigative and prosecutorial powers creates structural tensions, as well as 
challenges the impartiality of investigations.”284 The result of this non-independent 
structure has been the perpetuation of impunity as it has allowed for the executive to 
interfere in the investigations of the Prosecution, particularly in cases involving police 
officers.  As a result of this interference, the Prosecution has repeatedly decided to 
close off investigations of police abuses.  
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In cases involving crimes of government employees committed on official duty, the 
Prosecution is the only body entitled to initiate criminal proceedings against them: 
whether to refer a case to trial or to close off the investigations or re-open them, or to 
bring charges against the perpetrators and modify them285 or to appeal court verdicts.286 
These features present elements of structural  impunity as they constitute inherent 
features of the legal system, i.e. the Criminal Proceedings Code. Due to these features 
of the legal system, the Prosecution is left with exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute 
police abuses, as well as the utter discretion to decide on the fate of the proceedings.  
In light of its lack of independence from the executive authority as discussed above, 
leaving the Prosecution with such wide discretionary powers can ultimately lead to 
decisions favoring the police, rather than the victims. 
Indeed, this is exactly what happened in the case of Ramlat Boulaq, where the Public 
Prosecution used this discretionary power to close off the cases against the police 
officers. It is important to note that this practice of shelving cases has been widely 
used by the Prosecution in cases of police abuse. A Human Rights Watch report on 
torture published in January 2011 reviewed a number of cases of torture and ill-
treatment that did not reach court because the Prosecution decided to close the 
investigations, as in the present case.287 Once a case is shelved, victims can appeal this 
decision to a superior prosecutor, whose decision is final.288 In most cases, the public 
prosecutors do not rule in favor of the appeal of the victims.289 In the rare cases where 
the Public Prosecutor decides to re-open the case, then he refers it to a different local 
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prosecutor for investigation.290 This mechanism of appeal is another example of 
structural impunity as it is an inherent feature of the legal system. The fact that the 
appeal is lodged to the same body that issued the decision further supports the 
exclusive discretionary authority of the Prosecution to decide on the fate of 
proceedings. As the Human Rights Report has shown, due to the lack of independent 
judicial review, most appeals filed against the decisions of the prosecutors' to close off 
investigations have been rejected, and accordingly have contributed to the perpetuation 
of impunity. 
Over all, the above mentioned features of the Egyptian legal framework can be 
attributed to the structural dimension of impunity. The legal system provides very few 
and restricted avenues for the victims to effectively engage in the process, and 
eventually leaves them with no legal means to pursue their perpetrators.  Furthermore, 
it does not provide any safeguards which guarantee that abuses of government 
employees will be duly investigated and prosecuted. 
2. Strategic Impunity
I have defined strategic impunity as ad-hoc decisions taken by the state in response to 
a specific circumstance to derail a process of accountability or demands for truth and 
justice; for example the decisions of the Prosecution to close off investigations of 
human rights violations. While the Prosecution ordered the detention of 51 residents, it 
ordered the release Ali.291 One of the most important reasons behind pre-trial detention 
is to limit the ability of the suspect to tamper with the evidence and affect the 
witnesses. There is no doubt that the suspect here, being a police officer charged with 
murder, has the ability by virtue of his authority to affect the witnesses and also go 
after the injured victims and pressure their families to change their testimonies, as well 
as tamper with the evidence.292 The decision by the Prosecution to release Ali is an 
example of strategic impunity as it is not an inherent feature of the legal system since 
the reasons prescribed in the law for pre-trial detention is to prevent suspects from 
tampering with the evidence or affect witnesses. On the other hand, the decision was 
290 Id.
291 EIPR, supra note 247.
292 Id.
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precisely taken, despite the criteria set forth for the conditions of pre-trial detention, to 
derail the accountability process against the officer by giving him the opportunity to 
tamper with the evidence. Furthermore, this decision has shown the Prosecution's bias 
in the present case where it ordered the detention of the residents, who do not have the 
power or means to neither tamper with the evidence nor affect the witnesses, unlike 
their police counterparts. 
Finally, the investigative judge decided to shelve the cases on the basis that there was 
no reason to institute proceedings.293  This decision is an example of strategic impunity 
as it is an active measure taken to derail accountability of the police officers. The 
evidence could have eventually led to the sentencing of the police officers if it had 
reached a criminal trial. However, the Prosecution anticipated this and accordingly 
made the decision to dismiss the evidence and shelve the case, thus derailing the 
process of accountability. 
It is important to note that the residents have reported that on September 9th 2012, the 
police officer Hisham Etman, fired gun shots at them and terrorized them.294 By 
releasing police officers accused of such crimes and not holding them accountable, the 
Prosecution has not only allowed them to intimidate the victims and the residents, but 
also to continue their abuse. The police officers, despite having faced criminal 
charges, remain confident enough to further terrorize their victims. This incident 
presents a glimpse inside the mentality of police officers: they do believe that they are 
above the law, and thus they continue to further abuse their power. 
3.  Political/Psychological Impunity
Although I do not use the political/psychological dimension offered by Mc Sherry & 
Mejía,295 I think it is important to note this dimension here as the following incident 
293 The closure of investigations is decided after the prosecutor determines that there are no sufficient 
grounds to initiate proceedings where the case is put on file (hifz). According to Article 805 of the 
Instructions of the Prosecution, there are three mentioned reasons to shelve the case: “inability to 
identify the perpetrator; or insufficient evidence; or non-relevance of the complaint”. Prosecutors 
cannot close off investigations before they complete the initial investigations of the evidence and 
collect the testimonies of the victims, their families, or their lawyers. Human Rights Watch, supra 
note 19, at 42
294 Interview with Mohamed Khedr, EIPR lawyer (Nov. 16, 2013). 
295 Mc. Sherry & Mejía, supra note 89 at 3. 
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cannot be fully captured through the structural or strategic dimensions. On August 3rd 
2012, Lieutenant Ahmed Gamal al- Din, the Minister of Interior, honored the police 
officers involved in the incidents for their alleged protection of the buildings against 
the attacks by the “thugs and registered offenders” who imposed fees on the hotel.296 
The honoring of the police officers occurred before the conclusion of an investigation 
and an assessment of the conduct of the police in the events.297 al-Masry al-Youm 
published videos on the Internet showing police officers appearing half naked, without 
shirts and in their underwear, showing extreme unprofessional conduct.298 
Furthermore, the residents complained that the police used tear gas excessively inside 
the residential areas that are already overcrowded which led to the injury of a number 
of residents including children.299 Yet despite these accounts, and the footage showing 
police officers engaging in unprofessional conduct and excessive use of force, the 
Minister of Interior honored them. 
This decision by the Minister can be captured under the political/psychological as it 
was aimed at sending a certain political message to the public. The Ministry claimed 
that the victims were baltagiyya, a “socially disruptive and potentially criminal 
subject.”300 This concept has been continuously presented by the authorities to the 
public as an association of the “expansion of informality in housing”301 such as the 
slums of Ramlat Boulaq where the management of these populations became 
“diagnosed as a social problem relating to a type of social deviance which required 
normalization interventions”302 and the enforcement of “tougher policing”.303 This 
stigmatization of the popular neighborhoods in the public discourse has enforced the 
rhetoric of the Ministry which considers that those baltagiyya must be subjected to 
that excessive use of force, as it is the only way to neutralize their danger in society. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Minister to honor the police officers enforces the 
296 EIPR, supra note 211. 
297
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298 Video: sil  al-f nil t al-d khil yah  yazhar f  mawqi at  Nile Cityāḥ ā ā ā ī ̣ ī ʻ  (’Al Masry ’Al Youm 2013) 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?
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following notions: police abuse is not only acceptable but also preferable when dealing 
with the residents of popular neighborhoods, and it gives the political/psychological 
message to the public that the death of such victims is not only justified, but also 
necessary to maintain public order and safety. 
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V.  Breaking the Cycle of Impunity
I have highlighted in the previous chapters some structural and strategic elements of 
impunity within the Egyptian legal system. However, there are other important 
elements that were not particularly raised in the cases of Maspero and Ramlat Boulaq. 
For example, civil society organizations have raised other issues such as military trials 
for civilians, the definitions of torture in the Penal Code, and the Forensics 
Department. In this chapter, I will use the structural/strategic framework to discuss 
briefly these issues. 
Furthermore, the distinction between both dimensions has enabled me to highlight the 
inherent features of the legal system and the ad-hoc state actions separately, and assess 
how they operate together. I found that strategic impunity is not always the result of 
the “factual”, i.e. outside of the legal system, but it can also be the result of the 
“structural”, i.e. the legal system.  In other words, the structural impunity embodied in 
legal system can allow for the strategic impunity to occur. 
Building on this idea, I will refer to “structural reform” as a reform initiative that seeks 
to repeal elements of structural impunity by anticipating opportunities for strategic 
impunity and accordingly prescribing guarantees that can prevent the ad-hoc decision 
of the state from derailing accountability. The form of the 'structural reform' is not the 
main factor, as each element of structural impunity can have different ways to address 
it (e.g. constitutional amendments, legislations, administrative regulations,...etc). 
Rather, the prerequisite for a reform initiative to be “structural” is that it takes into 
consideration the instances of strategic impunity and its design is fit for preventing the 
ad-hoc decisions of the state from affecting the process of accountability. In addition, 
the “structural reform” must address all elements of structural impunity that arise from 
a specific issue, and not only some of them. In other words, for the reform to be 
“structural”, it has to be comprehensive. From this perspective, I will use the  
structural/strategic framework to analyze some reform measures taken by the 
authorities since the Revolution and the “Police for Egypt” Initiative. 
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A. The Military Judiciary 
I have shown through my analysis of the CMJ and the Maspero case that the military 
judiciary has largely contributed to the perpetuation of impunity due to its lack of 
independence and its exclusive jurisdiction over military abuses. During their time in 
office, the first elected parliament and President after the Revolution never discussed 
in public the issue of prosecuting military personnel involved in human rights 
violations before civilian courts. The democratically elected authorities chose to 
overlook this inherent structural dimension of impunity, not because they do not 
realize that military trials will result in impunity, but rather they did not want to 
challenge the military by providing the opportunity to hold its members accountable. 
Furthermore, the 2012 suspended constitution and the new draft constitution use the 
same language of the CMJ by stating that the military judiciary has the exclusive 
jurisdiction to resolve disputes of the military. This means that the upcoming 
parliament must undergo a constitutional amendment, rather than legislative 
amendments, to allow for trials of military human rights abuses before the civilian 
judiciary.304 If the new draft constitution is adopted, it will uphold this crucial element 
of structural impunity where as none of the gross human rights violations committed 
by SCAF while in power, and the ongoing human rights violations committed by the 
military, can be duly punished. 
The only issue discussed by the authorities regarding the military judiciary was trials 
of civilians before military courts.305 After the fall of Mubarak, the military was 
deployed across the country. The military has continuously argued that all crimes 
occurring in locations managed by it falls under the jurisdiction of the military courts. 
This argument is supported by Article 48 of the CMJ as it gives the military judiciary 
the exclusive right to decide on its jurisdiction.306 This situation has led to the massive 
number of military trials for civilians. General Adel Morsy, member of the SCAF, 
304 Adel Ramadan, Dawlat Q d  al-Qud h al- Askar , EIPR (Dec. 22, 2013), ā ị ̄ ạ̄ ʻ ī available at 
http://eipr.org/blog/post/2013/12/22/1906. 
305 Majlis al-sha b yun qish mashr  q n n l -mana  mu kamat al-madan y n am m al-qa  al-ʻ ā ūʻ ā ū ī ʻ ḥā ī ī ā ḍāʼ
askar  ,ʻ ī  ONA-EG, Apr. 10, 2012, available at http://onaeg.com/?p=52905.
306 The ECSER filed a lawsuit number 33151 of 65 before the State Council, arguing that Article 48 is 
unconstitutional. The State Council referred the case to the Supreme Constitutional Court; at the 
time of writing, the Court has not issued its decision yet. 
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mentioned in a press conference in September 2011 that between January 28 and 
August 29 [2011], military tribunals tried 11,879 civilians...the tribunals convicted 
8,071, including 1,836 suspended sentences; a further 1,225 convictions are awaiting 
ratification by the military.”307 Military trials for civilians are an element of structural 
impunity as it is a feature of the  legal system, i.e. the CMJ and the former and current 
draft constitutions. These trials have resulted in human rights violations such as the 
right to fair trial where as victims of military trials have no means to seek redress for 
the violations they have endured, thus resulting in impunity.  
The dissolved parliament realized this important structural dimension of impunity 
where they agreed on the removal of Article 48 and Article 6 which allows the 
President to refer civilians to military courts.308 They also agreed that the military 
prosecution should refer all the cases of civilians currently being processed before it to 
the Public Prosecution, and to cancel all the verdicts against civilians issued by the 
military courts and their retrial before civilian courts.309 During the discussions in 
parliament, the military was quiet resistant to all these calls of reform.310 One 
parliamentarian member proposed the compromise that instead of canceling all the 
verdicts, the appeals can be submitted to the Public Prosecution.311 However, General 
Mamduh Shahin also rejected this proposal.312 The parliament was later dissolved in 
June 2012 and none of these proposals were ever passed. 
The 2012 suspended constitution did not ban trials of civilians before military courts313 
although earlier drafts explicitly prohibited it, then it was abruptly changed in the 
latest version of the draft.  Furthermore, the current constitutional declaration in force 
upholds the long-standing principle of allowing civilians to be tried before military 
courts by; first not explicitly banning it, and secondly by vaguely mentioning that the 
307 See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Retry or Free 12,000 After Unfair Military Trials, 
10 Sept. 2011, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/10/egypt-retry-or-free-12000-after-
unfair-military-trials.These trials were mostly for regular crimes and not political cases. 
308 Majlis al-sha b yun qish mashr  q n n l -mana  mu kamat al-madan y n am m al-qa  al-ʻ ā ūʻ ā ū ī ʻ ḥā ī ī ā ḍāʼ
askar  ,ʻ ī  ONA-EG, Apr. 10, 2012, available at http://onaeg.com/?p=52905.
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313 Art. 198, Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Dec. 25, 2012, suspended on July 3, 2013. 
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military judiciary has jurisdiction to try all crimes relating to the armed forces.314  
Furthermore, the military exerted pressure on the committee drafting the 
constitutional amendments against the ban of trials of civilians before military 
courts.315 Article 198 of the final draft constitution did not only allow military trials for 
civilians, but also included the detailed text from the CMJ's jurisdiction provision.316 
Supporters of this provision have argued that the current draft specifies the 
circumstances in which civilians can be tried before military courts. However these 
circumstances expand the jurisdiction of military courts rather than limit it. Notably, 
the head of the military judiciary openly stated that anyone who gets into a fight inside 
a gas station owned by the armed forces will be referred to a military trial.317 
While these articles are elements of structural impunity, the pressure exerted by the 
military on the members of the constitutional-committee, and the dissolved parliament 
are examples of strategic impunity, as they were ad-hoc actions taken by the military 
in response to demands of justice, i.e., the calls of banning military trials for civilians 
and the canceling of verdicts against civilians issued by the military courts. In this 
instance, the ad-hoc decision of the military to prevent the prohibition of military 
trials for civilians has enabled the structural dimension of impunity to prevail. 
B. Torture
The current definitions of torture in the Egyptian penal code are examples of 
structural impunity as they present an inherent feature of the legal system. Article 128 
requires that torture occurs with the aim of extracting a confession, thus excluding all 
cases where police have tortured citizens for other reasons.318  For example, if a victim 
314 Art. 18, Constitutional Declaration of the Arab Republic of Egypt, July 8, 2013.
315 Egyptian activists protest military trials in new draft constitution, Al Monitor, Nov. 23, 2013,  
available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/egypt-military-trials-civilians-
draft-constitution-protests.html#ixzz2lUp8yz1u. 
316 Art. 198 states that “no civilian can be tried before a military court except in the crimes that 
constitute a direct attack against military buildings, camps, or whatever lies under its control, 
military areas and borders, equipment, boats, weapons, ammunition, documents, secrets, general 
funds, factories, crimes relating to military conscription, or crimes that constitute a direct attack 
against its officers, or members while on duty”. draft Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 
available at http://egelections-2011.appspot.com/Dostour/Dostour_update2013.pdf. 
317 Birn mij Hun  al- simatā ā ʻĀ ̣  (CBC television broadcast Dec. 1, 2013), available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qiKYizlKu3U. 
318 Art. 128 states that any public servant or official who orders, or participates in, the torture of an 
accused person with a view to inducing him to make a confession shall be punished by 
imprisonment at hard labor or a term of 3 to 10 years in prison. If the victim dies, the penalty shall 
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is tortured by the police for purposes of intimidation or revenge, then the penal code 
does not recognize the crime as torture. This inadequate definition of torture has led 
prosecutors to rely on other articles such as Article 129.319 This article defines the 
crime as excessive use of force by public servants and accordingly prescribe must less 
severe penalties (no more than one year imprisonment or a fine of 200 EGP). So even 
in the case of a successful prosecution of torture, the result will be impunity as the 
punishment is in no way appropriate to the nature of the crime. 
The issue of the penalty for torture was discussed by the dissolved parliament in May 
2012. They agreed to increase the penalty of torture to 5 years, and to add a provision 
stating that anyone who was aware of an incident of torture and did not report it, shall 
be punished by one year imprisonment.320 These proposals were not passed as the 
parliament was dissolved in June 2012. The 2012 suspended constitution did in fact 
provide a better definition of torture,321 however this is yet to be translated into 
amendments of the Penal Code. The 50-member committee that drafted amendments 
to the 2012 suspended constitution stated that the provision of torture was amended 
according to the UN definition, and accordingly the Penal Code will be amended after 
be that prescribed for premeditated murder. Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed 
in 1952), al-Jar dah al-rasm yahī ī  (Egypt). The provision falls short of the definition provided by 
Art. 2 of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment which Egypt has ratified in 1986. The article defines torture as “any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an 
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such 
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent o acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.  It does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions”,  Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res.  A/RES/39/46, 93rd Sess. 
(Dec. 10, 1984). 
319 Art. 129 states that any public servant or official who uses excessive force on duty shall be 
punished by no more than one year or a fine of no more than 200 EGP. See also Art. 282 which 
states that in all cases, [for] anyone who unlawfully arrests a person and threatens to kill him or 
subject him to physical torture shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor or a term of 3 to 10 
years in prison. If the victim dies, the penalty shall be that prescribed for premeditated murder. Law 
No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952),al-Jar dah al-rasm yahī ī  (Egypt). 
320 Parliament committee approves harsher penalties for torture, Egypt Independent, May. 5, 2012, 
available at http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/parliament-committee-approves-harsher-
penalties-torture.
321 Art. 36 states that any person placed under arrest or detained or whose freedom is restricted in any 
way shall receive treatment that respects human dignity. Such person may not be subjected to 
torture, intimidation, coercion and/or physical or mental abuse. No person may be detained or 
arrested unless placed in a humanly decent and healthy place that is subject to judicial supervision.  
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Dec. 25, 2012, suspended on July 3, 2013. 
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the adoption of the new constitution.322  However, the final draft constitution did not 
adopt the UN definition as claimed but only “prohibited torture in all its forms”.323 
In the absence of legislations amending the definitions of torture in the Penal Code, 
the structural dimension of impunity will prevail. At the same time, even if the Penal 
Code adopts the comprehensive UN definition, this will not be enough to end the 
systematic use of torture. The inadequate definition is not the only reason for the 
perpetuation of impunity, as there other elements of structural and strategic impunity 
that play an equally important role. For example, inaccurate forensic reports, 
tampering of the evidence by the police and decisions of the Prosecution to close off 
investigations are all examples of both strategic and structural impunity. Thus, the 
above mentioned reform initiatives cannot be considered 'structural' for two reasons: 
first, it is not comprehensive as it focuses on amending the Penal Code only, thus 
excluding other important elements of structural impunity. Second, it does not 
anticipate the opportunities for strategic impunity, since the state's interference 
through an ad-hoc decision is not deterred. 
 
C. The Public Prosecution
There have been no measures taken by the authorities to reform the structure of the 
Public Prosecution. The lack of independence of the Prosecution is a crucial element 
of the structural dimension of impunity where as its subordination to the Ministry of 
Justice has allowed for the executive authorities to severely interfere in legal 
proceedings against police officers.  I have highlighted through out this paper several 
examples of strategic impunity that the Prosecution has taken. One of the main causes 
for these decisions is this structural impunity where as the Prosecution became an 
apparatus of enforcing the state's ad-hoc decisions to derail accountability. In other 
words, this structural impunity (non-independence) paves the way for the strategic 
impunity to occur. Thus, any reform initiative that does not address this crucial 
element of structural impunity will be irrelevant. 
322 Egypt's New Constitution to Curtail Torture, All Africa, Oct. 27, 2013, available at 
http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00027195.html.
323 Art. 52, draft Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, available at http://egelections-
2011.appspot.com/Dostour/Dostour_update2013.pdf. 
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Another element of structural impunity that I have discussed in the previous chapter is 
Article 63 of the Law on Criminal Proceedings where it allows only the Public 
Prosecution to bring a case against a public servant. In May 2012, the dissolved 
parliament approved the removal of this article, however these amendments were not 
passed due to the dissolution of the parliament.324 However, the parliament did not 
address other elements of structural impunity in this law such as articles 210(1) and 
232(2) of the criminal proceedings code where victims can only appeal the 
prosecutor's decision to more senior members of the Prosecution.
D. The Forensics Department
The non-independence of the Forensic Department is another element of structural 
impunity where as the law considers it to be a subordinate body of the Ministry of 
Justice. This inherent structural feature of the department has led to the interference of 
the executive in the issuance of forensic reports in cases of torture.  One can recall the 
infamous case of Khalid Said, where he was beaten to death by police officers, but the 
forensic report stated that he died from asphyxiation. This is an example of strategic 
impunity where the executive has pressured the Forensics Department to issue a false 
report confirming the police's scenario that Said swallowed a packet of marijuana and 
was not killed by the police. Even after the Revolution, this scenario was repeated in 
March 2013. The Minister of Justice stated that Mohamed al-Gendi, who died from 
torture by the police, had died as a result of a car accident, four days before the 
Forensics Department issued its report.325  The first report issued confirmed the 
Minster's claims, then his family appealed to the Prosecution to order a re-
examination.326  The final report confirmed that he died from torture.327 Again, these 
are examples of strategic impunity where the Minster of Justice denied the torture of 
al-Gendi and pressured the Forensics Department to confirm his scenario. The 
strategic impunity occurred because the structural dimension of impunity allows it. If 
the Forensics Department was an independent body that did not have to answer to the 
Ministry of Justice, then the executive's ad-hoc decisions of exerting pressure on the 
324 Tashr yat al-sha b tuw fiq alá ta d l t al- uq b t al-kh ah b -jar mat al-ta dh bīʻī ʻ ā ʻ ʻ ī ā ʻ ū ā āṣṣ ī ī ʻ ī , Al Masry ’Al 
Youm, May. 15, 2012, available at http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/839851.
325 Egypt: False Forensics in Gendi's Death - Popular Current, All Africa, Feb. 13, 2013, available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201302141311.html.
326 Id.
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department to issue false reports, may not determine the outcome of the forensic 
report.
 
The manipulation of this department by the executive powers has led to several calls 
for removing it from the control of the Ministry of Justice. In March 2012, forensic 
experts submitted to the parliament a draft law on restructuring the Forensics 
Department. The draft law proposed the repeal of Law No. 69 of 1952 which considers 
the department as a consultative body to the Ministry of Justice.328 It also proposed the 
formation of a high council to manage the department, instead of the Ministry of 
Justice.329 However, this draft was not discussed by the parliament. The head of 
Forensics Experts Club called upon the 50-member committee to amend Article 182 
so that it affirms its independence, including providing its members with judicial 
immunity.330 However, the final draft constitution did not meet their demands.331 
E. Security Sector Reform
The restructuring of the Ministry of Interior is one of the main demands of the 
Revolution. Almost three years after the Revolution, police and security forces 
continue to use the same excessive force and systematic use of torture amongst other 
abuses. Despite the significance of the Revolution starting on National Police day, the 
authorities are yet to develop a political will for reforming the Ministry of Interior. 
Instead, they have embarked on a series of limited reforms that only aim to add 
cosmetic changes, rather than addressing the legacy of abuse and seeking to put an end 
to it. 
After succumbing to public pressure during the July 2011 sit-in in Tahrir, Mansur al-
Isawi, the Minister of Interior, ordered the largest reshuffle in the history of the 
Ministry. He claimed that this procedure was aimed at cleansing the Ministry of those 
328 Mashr  q n n l-istiql l al-tibb al-shar   an wiz rat al- adal,ū ā ū ā ī āʻ ̣ ʻ ʻ ʻ  Masress, Mar. 24, 2013, available 
at http://www.masress.com/ahram/138978. 
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Art. 199 states that judicial experts, forensic experts, and experts of the estate registration are 
independent in doing their jobs, and enjoy the needed guarantees and protection for performing 
their job, in accordance with the law. draft Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, available at 
http://egelections-2011.appspot.com/Dostour/Dostour_update2013.pdf. 
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responsible for the killing of the protesters in January 2011. However, this process did 
not in fact achieve its aim, but quite the opposite. Several police officers currently on 
trial for the killing of protesters were moved to positions with higher pay and better 
benefits.332  In November 2012, the Human Rights Department and Community 
Outreach, was established by a presidential decree. Lieutenant Hussein Fekry, the 
Director, explained that the department aims to change the mentality of police officers, 
by providing them with human rights trainings in the Police Academy, and conducting 
campaigns aimed at raising their awareness.333 He added that the department has 
printed posters with excerpts from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to be 
hung inside police stations.334 
In June 2012, the parliament passed legislative amendments to the police law.335 The 
amendments included the removal of the President as head of the police.336 It also 
legislated changes in the bonus and per diem for police officers.337 It also allowed 
police officers to request to serve in their hometowns, as long as they have fulfilled 
three transfer periods.338 It also banned military trials for police officers, and instead 
has established a disciplinary committee, appointed by the Minister of Interior, and it 
includes a member of the State Council.339 Also, the secretaries of the police can now 
request to be promoted to honorary lieutenants and officers.340 These amendments 
achieved some demands of the police as several protests and strikes were held by low-
ranking police officers demanding changes to the police law, including a ban on 
military trials for the police and instead referral to disciplinary committees, and pay 
332 For example, Wael El Komi has been transferred to the General Electricity Administration where he 
was given a higher position and a salary raise. Mutaz Al Askalani was transferred to the Police 
Academy, Mohamaed Saafan was transferred to the General Police Administration and Mostafa El 
Dami was transferred to the Training Department, See Press Release, FIDH, Egypt’s Revolutionary 
road, one year on: still awaiting respect for human rights and democratic reforms, Feb. 9, 2012, 
available at http://www.fidh.org/en/north-africa-middle-east/egypt/Egypt-s-Revolutionary-road-
one.
333 FIDH Interview with Lt. Hussein Fekry, Head of the Human Rights and Community Outreach 
Department of the Ministry of Interior, Cairo (May 19, 2013). 
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335
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increases.341 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior has been resisting external attempts to intervene 
in its reform. Instead, it has continued to insist that it is able to reform itself. In May 
2012, during the discussion of the amendments to the Police Law in the parliament, 
the head of the Ministry's legal department rejected the proposal to establish a 
monitoring mechanism over the Ministry.342 He claimed that such mechanism is an 
insult to the Ministry as it assumes that it adopts torture as its methodology.343 He 
added that there is no need for such a mechanism as all incidents of abuse and torture 
were individual acts before the Revolution and now the Ministry is able to monitor 
itself and refer those individuals to disciplinary actions.344 Certainly, the Ministry of 
Interior continues to deny that abuses by police forces are systematic and insists that 
they are individual isolated acts that are punished. Yet they have continuously failed to 
provide statistics on the exact number of police officers charged and put on trial for 
human rights abuses.345  
These limited measures do not address any of the structural or strategic dimensions of 
impunity. One important element of structural impunity is the lack of independent 
oversight over the Ministry which has helped transform it into a body above the law. 
The newly established Ministry's Human Rights Department can in no way be 
considered a mechanism of oversight over its human rights practices as it is part of the 
same entity that is responsible for gross human rights violations. Furthermore, the 
Ministry's refusal to admit that torture is systematic and to have external oversight over 
it, is a continuation of its decisions of strategic impunity where it continues to deny its 
responsibility for human rights violations, and exerts pressure to assure that violations 
341 Muz har t Uman  al-Shur ah fi 8 Muh faz t D dd El-Eisawy wa al-Muh kam t al- Askar yaḥā ā ā ṭ ạ̄ ạ̄ ị ạ̄ ā ʻ ī , 
al-Masry al-Youm, Mar. 22, 2011, available at 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/120692#. See also Intif d hā ạ  Uman  al-Shur ah, ā ṭ al-
Balad, Mar. 22, 2012, available at http://www.el-balad.com/116098.aspx. 
342 Wiz rat al-d khil yah tarfud muqtara  al-barlam n b -ta s s hay ah l-riq bah alá al-shurt hā ā ī ḥ ā ī ʼ ī ʼ ā ʻ ạ , 
Copts Today, May. 8, 2012, available at http://www.coptstoday.com/Egypt-News/Detail.php?
Id=13939. 
343 Id.
344 Id. See also art. 47 of the Police Law which states that each officer who violates the provisions of 
this law or the orders given by the Ministry of Interior or exceeds his line of work, shall be 
subjected to disciplinary action, without prejudice to any criminal or civil suits against him. Law 
No. 109 of 1971 on the Police), al-Jar dah al-rasm yah ī ī (Egypt). 
345 Amnesty International, supra note 8, at 26. 
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of its personnel will remain unchecked and unpunished. The cosmetic measures of 
“training of police officers” and “human rights posters in police stations” are not 
sufficient to change the mentality of the police or end their abuses. This requires much 
more measures that must include the complete cleansing of the Ministry and full 
accountability. These two prerequisites, which can produce deterrence for future 
human rights violations, were not addressed in the above mentioned state reforms.  
Over all, the measures taken by the authorities for legislative and security sector 
reforms do not even reach the minimal standards needed for combating impunity. The 
reforms did not comprehensively address the structural elements of impunity, or take 
into consideration instances of strategic impunity so as to prevent it from occurring. 
The first democratically elected President and two houses of parliament had the 
opportunity to take the necessary measures to enact the much needed structural 
reforms. The reason they missed this opportunity is not because they fail to understand 
the several dimensions of impunity within the system, but because they lacked the 
political will to end it. Mc Sherry & Mejía make a very important observation where 
they state that:
Impunity is a central pillar of systems of repression; if the perpetrators can be 
condemned and held accountable to civil society, the system begins to crumble. 
Conversely, military institutions and individual murderers and torturers may continue 
to act outside the law if impunity is upheld by civilian governments.346
I think that the authorities realized that reforming the legal system and ending 
impunity can threaten their grip on power. Their reluctance to hold the police 
accountable and reform the security sector can be attributed to their desire in 
maintaining the status quo for future use against their opponents. For example in 
January 2013, during the second anniversary of the Revolution, the police attacked 
anti-Morsy demonstrations leaving at least 53 dead.347  Also, Morsy promised prior to 
his election to ensure retribution to the martyrs of the Revolution if he is elected. 
346 Mc Sherry & Meija, supra note 89, at 5. 
347
 See Press Release, FIDH, Egypt: Post Revolution president following in Mubarak’s footsteps?, Jan.  
31, 2013, available at  http://www.fidh.org/en/north-africa-middle-east/egypt/Egypt-Post-
Revolution-president-12811; Former President Morsy also applauded the police for their actions in 
a televised speech on 27th of January 2013 available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=sRdV74amMRY. 
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Shortly after his election, he set up the fact-finding commission, however the report 
was never made public and none of the incidents covered by it was ever referred to 
trial.348 Morsy's decision to not publicize the report is an example of strategic impunity 
as it not only denies the victims the right to truth, but also prevents the potential legal 
cases that they can file based on the evidence collected by the fact-finding committee. 
This decision has assured that the crimes committed under SCAF's rule will remain 
unpunished.  
F. “Police for Egypt” Initiative
While the authorities have failed to provide sufficient measures to end impunity, civil 
society groups have presented several proposals for transitional justice, and security 
sector reform. One of the proposals that tackles impunity through its multiple 
dimensions is the Initiative for the Re-building of the Egyptian Police (“Police for 
Egypt”).349 This initiative includes academics, human rights lawyers and activists, 
business men, former police officers and other political activists.350 The members of 
the initiative bring a wide range of expertise; firstly, the two police colonels provide 
insight into the functions of the police, secondly, human rights experts give the 
initiative a rights-based perspective, and thirdly, academics and legal scholars provide 
the much needed legal background and expertise. 
The initiative proposes measures for institutional reform of the Ministry of Interior, 
monitoring mechanisms of the Ministry and a mechanism of transitional justice. I will 
not discuss the measures of institutional reform of the Ministry as it falls outside the 
scope of this paper. Instead, I will analyze only the measures proposed for transitional 
348 Former President Mohamed Morsy issued a presidential Decree No. 10 of 2012, establishing a fact-
finding commission mandated to “collect information, evidence and conduct fact-finding in the 
incidents of attempted murder, murder and injury of protesters between the period of 25 January 
2011 until 30 June 2012; in order to collect the full facts regarding the perpetrators, whether they 
were direct or indirect perpetrators.”, EIPR, supra note 150. 
349 Al-mub darah al-wat n yah l -i dat bin  al-shurt h  ā ạ ī ī ʻā āʼ ạ [hereinafter “Police for Egypt”] (4th ed. 
2013) available at http://www.policeforegypt.org. The paper was originally drafted by the former 
police colonel, Mohamed Mahfuz during a conference in May 2011 and underwent vigorous 
discussion until it was finally published in July 2011. Since then, the working group discussed the 
proposal in the media, in the parliament and with the executive authorities. It is continuously being 
discussed by consultation with several institutions and updated with the new developments, as well 
through examination of past experiences of countries that underwent similar security reforms. A 
fourth edition was published in June 2013. 
350 Id. at 2. 
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justice and monitoring of the Ministry. At the same time, it is important to note that 
the proposed institutional reforms of the Ministry351 may assist in changing its modes 
of operation, but they are not enough to combat impunity. These institutional reforms 
must be made alongside the transitional justice and monitoring mechanisms discussed 
below.   
1.  Monitoring Mechanisms
The lack of independent monitoring mechanisms over the Ministry of Interior, is an 
element of structural impunity as the legal framework does not provide sufficient 
avenues for the independent monitoring of the Ministry, particularly by civil society 
organizations. The Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has stated in his report that “it is 
now widely accepted that one of the best safeguards against torture and ill treatment is 
for places of detention to be as transparent as possible..[as] regular and periodic visits 
by independent monitoring groups are central to protecting the rights of detainees.”352 
Combating impunity should not only be about ensuring the punishment of perpetrators 
of human rights violations, but also preventing human rights violations from occurring 
in the first place.  
The initiative addresses this point and proposes that the Ministry should allow civil 
society organizations (lawyers and doctors from the syndicate, human rights 
organizations, civil associations) to make announced visits to all police stations and 
351 These include maintaining the Ministry's civilian nature, by appointing a civilian as its head; the 
decentralization of the Ministry, and its transformation into a more localized police force; the repeal 
of the Minister of Defense Decree No. 11 of 1891 which considers the Ministry of Interior as a 
military-related institution, and article 2 (b) of the CMJ which allows for military conscripts to join 
the Ministry of Interior as part of their military duty; providing the police with training and 
technological resources for law-enforcement;  the removal of the National Security from the control 
of the Ministry and transferring it to an independent body, with clear oversight, defined regulations, 
and parliamentarian review; ending the infiltration of the Ministry in state bureaucracy by 
allocating these departments (the lottery for the pilgrimage, civil records, work permits abroad, 
immigration services, traffic, and prisons) to the relevant ministries; removal of the Central 
Security Forces department and replacing it with a professional riot police unit; restructuring of the 
education process in the Police Academy; improvement of the working conditions of the employees 
of the Ministry including by establishing an independent syndicate and restructuring of the system 
of salaries/bonuses; amendments to article 19 and 71 of the Police law. Id., at 13-19. 
352 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons 
and Conditions of Detention in Africa (Oct. 9-22, 2012), available at 
http://www.achpr.org/sessions/52nd/intersession-activity-reports/prisons-and-conditions-of-
detention/. 
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detention centers and receive all requested information.353 It is important to note that 
this should not be left to the Ministry's discretion, but rather the right of access to 
independent monitors should be guaranteed. However, legislations prescribing that 
right can be inefficient if the Ministry choses to not comply with them or implement 
them. Thus, in order to propose structural reforms that can combat this element of 
structural impunity, it must anticipate the strategic dimension of impunity. In other 
words, the structural reforms should prescribe strict guarantees against the non-
compliance of the Ministry of Interior so as to prevent the opportunity to reject visits 
or limit them. 
Furthermore, the initiative demands that the Prosecution conducts unannounced visits 
to police stations regularly, and report on their findings.354 Article 22 of the Criminal 
Proceedings Code already gives the Public Prosecution the right to search and conduct 
visits to detention centers.355 However, it rarely does so, and even when it does, the 
visit is announced to the police station beforehand. Thus, the implementation of this 
article will be irrelevant if the Prosecution's structural dimension of impunity remains 
unchanged. 
In addition, the initiative presents an excellent idea: the setting up of surveillance 
cameras inside all police stations and detention places.356 While this measure can help 
in transparency, deterrence and documentation of human rights violations inside 
police stations and detention centers, it lacks the guarantees against strategic impunity. 
If the surveillance cameras are managed by the police, then they could still tamper 
with evidence, destroy footage,...etc. Thus, the measure should have a second 
dimension: oversight and cross-examination of these cameras by an independent body. 
Furthermore, this can provide checks and balances against the investigation body and 
the Forensics Department. In the situation of an inaccurate forensic report or 
353 Police for Egypt, supra note 349, at at 23.
354 Id. at 21. It also proposes that the Prosecution should also establish a hot-line to receive complaints 
about human rights violations in police stations. Id.
355 Art. 22 states that those mandated with judicial arrest are subordinates to the Public Prosecution 
and subjected to his supervision regarding their methods of work. The Public Prosecutor can ask 
the relevant body to look into all incidents of negligence or wrongdoing of their duties in work and 
take disciplinary actions against them; without prejudice to criminal proceedings.  Law No. 150 of 
1950 (Code on Criminal Proceedings), al-Jar dah al-rasm yah ī ī (Egypt). 
356 Police for Egypt, supra note 349, at 19.
69
inadequate investigations, the video footage can then guarantee the availability of 
evidence.  
As noted in chapter four, one of the main elements of structural impunity is the fact 
that the police are in charge of investigating themselves. The initiative proposes a 
method of overcoming this conflict of interest, by establishing an independent 
committee mandated to investigate all cases of death and severe injury at the hands of 
the police.357 This committee would conduct investigations in cooperation with the 
Public Prosecution, as well as receive complaints from citizens. In order for this 
measure to combat this element of structural impunity, it has to anticipate the 
strategic impunity and provide strict guarantees to prevent it. Thus, the measure 
should include guarantees for the independence of the members, access to all files and 
detention centers, powers to summon police officers for investigations, and order their 
detention if needed. In addition, structural reform for one element of structural 
impunity has to address other elements of structural impunity that affect it. Since this 
committee will cooperate with Prosecution, then another element of structural 
impunity (its non-independence) must be addressed.  Furthermore, in order to provide 
checks-and-balances to the powers of the Prosecution, there must be guarantees 
ensuring that the Prosecution cannot intervene to derail the investigations of the 
committee. 
I have highlighted earlier how the torture articles in the Penal Code are elements of the 
structural impunity. I have also noted that legislative amendments to the Penal Code 
are not enough to combat torture. A more comprehensive plan needs to be developed 
and implemented. The initiative addresses this issue and proposes the establishment of 
a national institution for the combat of torture.358 This institution will consist of 
members of the civil society, lawyers, doctors, psychologists,...etc. In order to ensure 
its independence, the committee cannot include any member currently holding a post 
in the state.359 This committee shall conduct unannounced visits to all detention places, 
and police stations, report quarterly on its visits, make recommendations to the 
357 Id. at 22.
358 Id. at 22.
359 Id. at 22.
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relevant authorities, meet with detainees, witnesses in private, receive complaints of 
torture from citizens and human rights groups, access all information, and develop 
strategies for the prevention of torture.360 While this measure addresses several 
elements of strategic and structural impunity, it must also provide guarantees for the 
committee's independence and implementation of its activities, in order to preempt 
instances of strategic impunity (e.g., state pressure to derail/prevent their activities). 
This committee should also be able to coordinate with the investigations committee. 
2. Transitional Justice
The initiative presents a good proposal for a transitional justice mechanism that 
addresses several dimensions of structural and strategic impunity raised above. It 
presents two parallel dimensions to accountability; the legal dimension which includes 
measures of transitional justice, and a mechanism of reviewing the records of police 
officers “vetting”.361 The initiative defined transitional justice as a method of ordinary 
justice that deals with the crimes of the former regime where the defendants enjoy the 
right to a fair trial.362  It includes all those who have been harmed or their families, 
physically or psychologically, or had their rights violated through direct acts or 
negligence.363 The definition of victims provided by the initiative is comprehensive as 
it adheres to international human rights standards, thus it can overcome elements of 
structural impunity in the national legal system.
The crimes defined by the initiative are crimes of plundering the peoples' money, 
torture, extra-judicial killings, arbitrary detention, and other crimes whether political 
or economic.364 The inclusion of economic crimes is indeed the correct approach as it 
overcomes the moral dilemma of only recognizing crimes related to political activities. 
For example, one cannot claim that a victim of torture is more important than a victim 
of poverty, corruption, or negligence of health care, transportation,...etc. Thus, by 
including both types of violations in the definition of the victim, the initiative has 
provided a morally correct and comprehensive approach to transitional justice. 
360 Id. at 22.
361 Id. at 8.
362 Id.
363 Id.
364 Id. 
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While the decision to include economic crimes presents a positive aspect, the 
definitions provided in the initiative are a bit vague and thus do not address elements 
of structural impunity arising from inadequate definitions of certain crimes in national 
legislations. I think that the proposal should include a reference to violations of the 
rights prescribed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which Egypt has 
ratified. The inclusion of violations of these rights in the 'crimes' can address elements 
of structural impunity by overcoming the inadequate definitions in legislations. It will 
also add the recognition of some sets of rights that are not enshrined in the 
constitution and legislations. This can then guarantee that all human rights violations 
are covered, regardless of the existing elements of structural impunity in the legal 
system.
 
As for the definition of “criminals of the former regime”, it provides a comprehensive 
approach as it includes all persons who have held supervisory or executive posts in all 
sectors of the state, including the executive, legislative, and judicial sectors, and have 
committed themselves crimes prescribed in the initiative, or used others to commit 
these crimes, since 1981 until June 2012 (when former President Mohamed Morsy 
took office).365 While this definition includes officials “who used others to commit 
crimes”, it does not address elements of structural impunity in legislations regarding 
superior responsibility.366 In order to overcome the restriction of “giving the order” to 
commit the crime, international standards for command/superior responsibility should 
be adopted, to include “knew, or had reason to know” about the commission of the 
crime by their subordinates, and “did not take all necessary and reasonable measures 
in their power to prevent the commission, or if such crimes were committed, to punish 
the persons responsible”.367 This is important because high-ranking officials in the 
365 Id.
366 Police officers must implement the orders given precisely within the limits of the law and that each 
superior is responsible for the orders that he gives and the proper functioning of the order within his 
jurisdiction. Art. 41(c) of Law No. 109 of 1971 (Police Law), al-Jar dah al-rasm yah ī ī (Egypt).
367
“Commanders and other superiors are criminally responsible for war crimes committed by their 
subordinates if they knew, or had reason to know, that the subordinates were about to commit or 
were committing such crimes and did not take all necessary and reasonable measures in their power 
to prevent their commission, or if such crimes had been committed, to punish the persons 
responsible. State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable 
in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”  The International Committee of the 
Red Cross, Rule 153. Command Responsibility for Failure to Prevent, Repress or Report War 
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Ministry of Interior have repeatedly stated that they are not aware of the “individual” 
cases of torture in police stations across the country. Thus, by adhering to the “knew, 
or had reason to know” standard, the command responsibility of these officials will be 
recognized and so they cannot escape punishment due to the structural elements of 
impunity. This can also help overcoming limitations of criminal trials in proving the 
commission of the order from high-ranking officials.368 
Furthermore, most of the current trials that have started after the Revolution focus 
mostly on the killings of the protesters during the Revolution. This presents a severe 
problem where crimes of the past have not been addressed in any way. It is believed 
that “governments should prosecute their predecessors' atrocious crimes because the 
trials can advance a nation's transition to democracy”.369 By doing so, the states 
demonstrate that “no sector is above the law, prosecutions of state crimes can foster 
respect for democratic institutions and thereby deepen a society's democratic 
culture.”370 In that sense, the initiative takes the correct approach to include human 
rights violations prior to the Revolution. 
At the same time, I think that setting the starting date at 1981 presents a moral and 
methodological problem. Instead, I would propose the starting date at 1952; where 
excessive human rights violations had been committed under Nasser and Sadat.371 
Crimes, available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter43_rule153. This 
standard is not only applicable in armed conflicts but has also been applied in torture cases in 
national courts. See e.g. Beth Vaan Schaak, Romagoza v. García, Proving Command Responsibility  
under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 59 Guild Prac. 170 (2002). 
Furthermore, the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda and the 
Apartheid Convention "have provided guidance on just how far-reaching command responsibility 
extends and further reinforces its status as a general principle of international humanitarian law as 
well as human rights law." Francisco Forrest Martin et al., International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law: Treaties, Cases, and Analysis 114 (1st ed. 2006). 
368 For example, in the verdict issued on June 22 2012, in the trial of Habib Al Adly's six aides: Ahmed 
Ramzy, Adly Fayed, Hassan Abdel Rahman, Hassan Youssef, Ismail El Shaer, Osama El Marasi, 
and Omar Afifi, the Court stated that there was no evidence of any communication or orders given 
or meetings held or an agreement between the defendants reached or incitement or assistance to 
other police officers to commit the alleged crimes. The Court ruled that they were innocent. In 
addition, it also said that the records failed to prove that there were orders given to the police to fire 
at protesters. The Court also stated that while the medical records show that there has been injuries 
and deaths, it is not enough to attribute these crimes to the defendants. Case no 1227/2011/Kasr al-
Nil Criminal Court, and Case no. 3642/2011/Kasr al-Nil Criminal Court. 
369
   Orentlicher, supra note 41, at 2543.
370 Id.
371 See e.g. Kandil, supra note 16.
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Given the obvious time and historical constraints of including these periods, there is a 
need to provide a practical solution to include this period. I firmly believe that in order 
to turn the page on the country's sixty year rule of oppression and state brutality, all 
these periods must be equally addressed. I fully understand the practical constraints of 
pursuing criminal legal proceedings for crimes committed since 1952; it can be 
difficult to find evidence for a criminal trial, and most of the perpetrators are possibly 
dead by now. However, I think that there is a need to develop other mechanisms of 
accountability that are not restricted to criminal legal proceedings. For example, a 
commission can be set up to provide the truth of what happened, and victims or their 
families can be given reparation. This mechanism will be designed for the purpose of 
telling the truth, and provide a sort of “national collective memory” of what happened 
during these periods. 
Moreover, the transitional justice system proposed by the initiative includes three 
institutions: an institution for accountability, justice, and complaints; an institution for 
reparations; and a Revolution Criminal Court. 372 The first institution is mandated to 
receive complaints of human rights violations committed since 1981.373 This 
mechanism will consist of current and former judges as well as national figures that 
enjoy a consensus, given that none of them have held executive posts in the former 
regime, or were known for their loyalty to the former regime.374 The decision to include 
non-judicial figures in this mechanism can be an asset, as it opens the door for 
involving human right organizations in the process, which can positively affect its 
outcome. 
The “accountability and justice” institution will be responsible for collecting 
information about members of the former regime who are suspected of crimes in 
accordance with legal procedures defined by the law and international human rights 
treaties, as well as through consultation with national human rights organizations.375 
The reference to international human rights treaties is particularly important as it can 
overcome elements of structural impunity present in national legislations.
372 Police for Egypt, supra note 349, at 10.
373 Id.
374 Id.
375 Id. at 9.
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The files gathered by this institution will then be submitted to the investigative judges 
(appointed by the High Council of the Judiciary) and then referred to the Revolution 
Criminal Court.376 In addition, the institution will compile information on members of 
the High Council for the Police since January 25th until June 2012, as well as all 
General Security directors and assistants, directors of the Criminal Investigations 
Department, directors of the Central Security Forces, and State Security departments, 
in all the governorates that witnessed death and injury of protesters since January 25th 
until the end of the mandate of the institution.377  It will also compile information 
about police officers, and individuals involved in the killings of protesters in the 
clashes during SCAF's rule, as well all police officers and other individuals involved 
in violations of human rights and corruption since 1981 until the end of the mandate of 
the institution.378 These lists provide a comprehensive methodology that can ensure 
that none of the employees of the Ministry can escape accountability. It is not merely 
focused on crimes of killing and torture, but also corruption. However, the list does not 
explicitly refer to the incidents where police officers have forged cases against 
individuals; a practice that was quiet common during Mubarak's rule.379
 
At the same time, the crimes that will be covered by this mechanism will incriminate a 
large section of the state apparatus, and so it is logical to expect that they may exert 
pressure over the institution's members to derail the accountability process (strategic 
impunity). Thus, the proposal must include guarantees for the independence and 
protection of the institution's members, in order to prevent strategic impunity from 
occurring. 
Furthermore, victims and their families who have participated in the legal proceedings 
against police officers involved in the killing and injury of the protesters during the 
Revolution have reported that they have faced pressure, threats and intimidation by the 
police.380 These are all examples of strategic impunity where state agents have used 
their power to affect the course of the proceedings by pressuring the victims, thus 
376 Id.
377 Id.
378 Id.
379 See Ismail, supra note 1 at 441. 
380 FIDH, supra note 332.
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derailing the process of accountability. The strategic impunity here was allowed due to 
the structural dimension of impunity where as the legal system does not adopt 
efficient measures to protect witnesses and victims. The proposal states that the 
protection of witnesses, informants, and victims will be guaranteed and their identity 
will not be revealed.381 However, the legal system already states that it will guarantee 
their protection, but the lack of efficient mechanisms to achieve this goal has rendered 
it ineffective. Thus, the proposal should prescribe specific programs and measures to 
ensure the implementation of the protection. 
In order to ensure a comprehensive approach to accountability, members of the 
military who were involved in human rights violations must be held accountable. All 
of the cases that were previously tried before military tribunals for human rights 
violations, such as the Maspero and the virginity tests, must be referred to the 
Revolution Criminal Court. Unfortunately, the initiative does not make any explicit 
reference to members of the armed forces.382 As I have discussed previously, during 
SCAF's rule, military personnel were involved in grave human rights violations 
including extra-judicial killing, torture, virginity tests, and arbitrary detentions. I have 
also noted earlier how the exclusive jurisdiction of the CMJ over all military abuses is 
an element of structural impunity. In order to ensure that this element of impunity is 
overcome, legal measures need to be adopted prescribing that all past and ongoing 
human rights violations committed by the military will be tried before civilian courts. 
This is crucially important as the current jurisprudence of the Egyptian courts do not 
allow for crimes that were previously tried before military tribunals to be re-tried 
before civilian courts.383 
The second dimension to the transitional justice mechanism proposed by the initiative 
is the establishment of an institution mandated to provide reparation to victims from 
1981 until 30 June 2012.384 Given the difficult economic conditions gripping the 
381 Id.
382 Although I do realize that the proposal is strictly related to police reform, the initiative does 
propose a mechanism of transitional justice, and thus reference to the military is essential. 
383 All sentences issued by the military courts cannot be appealed before any other court. This was 
upheld by various rulings of the Court of Appeals, See e.g. Case no, 1212/60/Court of Appeal, Case 
no.2189/55/Court of Appeal, Case no.3753/61/Court of Appeal.
384 Police for Egypt, supra note 349, at 9.
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country since the Revolution, and the high deficit of government spending, the 
initiative provides a great solution to securing the funds for reparation to victims. The 
initiative proposes that all fines and confiscation of funds arising from court verdicts 
against the former regime shall be entirely allocated to this institution, through a 
transparent procedure that is announced to the public.385  The current Council for the 
Care of Martyrs and the Injured of the January 25 Revolution, which has received 
wide criticism from victims and their families, will be dissolved, and all its files and 
funds will be reallocated to the this institution.386 In light of the criticism and 
corruption allegations against the current Council, the institution should adopt 
measures that can guarantee transparency and independent monitoring by civil society 
organizations. Civil society organizations, in particular must be able to effectively 
engage with this institution. 
Furthermore, reparation is defined by the initiative according to three main principles: 
compensation, restitution, and assistance.387 The proposal should instead explicitly 
refer to international standards for reparation which include “providing full and 
effective reparation to the victims and their families in its five forms: restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.”388 The 
adoption of this standard is crucial because combating impunity is not only about 
punishing the perpetrators, but also providing the victims with redress. In addition, the 
inclusion of “guarantees of non-repetition” is extremely important as it paves the way 
for extensive structural reforms of all elements of structural impunity. 
The third dimension of accountability proposed by the initiative is the Revolution 
Criminal Court. This court, which will consist of ordinary judges appointed by the 
High Council for the Judiciary, has jurisdiction to try former regime members which 
are referred to it by the investigative judges, who receive the files from the 
“accountability and justice” institution referred to above.389 The proposal not only 
mandates the court to rely on Egyptian legislations, but also international human 
385 Id.
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 See U.N. Principles on Remedy, supra note 184.
389 Police for Egypt, supra note 349, at 9.
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rights treaties.390 The reference to international human rights treaties in the court's 
jurisprudence is important as it can overcome structural elements of impunity present 
in national legislations. Furthermore, the court will have an appellate degree, thus 
ensuring that all these crimes are covered by one court.391 The proposal provides 
another important and positive aspect when it explicitly refers to guarantees of the 
right to fair trial according to international standards, including the publicity of the 
trials and the right to appeal.392  This will not only ensure that the trials are not 
politically motivated, but will help in strengthening of the rule of law in the country. 
 
In addition, Egyptian legislations does not allow for government employees to be 
suspended from their posts during the course of the trial, i.e., before the issuance of a 
guilty verdict. This structural dimension of impunity has led to the situation where 
police officers undergoing trials remain in their posts, and so are able to pressure and 
intimidate witnesses and victims. The proposal then tackles this problem and allows 
for the investigative judge and the Revolution Criminal Court to issue decisions to 
suspend suspects from their posts, or take other necessary measures in order to ensure 
that they do not affect witnesses or tamper with the evidence.393  At the same time, it 
provides the police the right to appeal these decisions.394 
One of the problems that rose during the course of the investigations of the killing and 
injury of the protesters during the Revolution was the non-cooperation of the Ministry 
with the Public Prosecution where it ignored their requests and refused to provide 
them with information.395 These are examples of strategic impunity where as the 
Ministry took ad-hoc decisions to derail the process of accountability. In order to 
overcome this imminent problem, the initiative obliges all state sectors to provide the 
transitional justice mechanisms with all the information it requests, as well was 
ensuring its non-interference in the process, and its obligation to implement all 
390 Id.
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 EIPR, Muh kamat Mubarak al-ula Furs h muhadara l-Tahq q al- Ad lahạ̄ ạ ̣ī ʻ ā , available at 
http://eipr.org/report/2013/01/17/1591. 
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decisions issued by the institutions.396 At the same time, prescribing obligation is not 
enough as it can still allow for the strategic impunity to occur, i.e. non-compliance and 
derailing of the accountability process. As I mentioned earlier, structural reforms 
should be able to anticipate opportunities of strategic impunity. Thus, this obligation 
should prescribe guarantees for its implementation. 
The Public Prosecution is also an essential element of both structural and strategic 
impunity where as it proved to be more of an obstacle rather than an administrator of 
justice. This was demonstrated by the poor investigations, the decisions to shelve cases 
and other decisions that aim at shielding officials from accountability. The initiative 
thus overcomes this crucial problem by referring all investigations and cases (of the 
“crimes of the former regime”) handled currently by the Prosecution to the transitional 
justice mechanisms.397 It also allows for these mechanisms to add charges, re-
investigate, and take all necessary measures to ensure that the evidence is not 
tampered with and that the witnesses are not pressured.398 
Furthermore, the proposal presents an administrative dimension to accountability. This 
mechanism referred to as “vetting” will establish an independent committee that 
consists of judges, legal experts, police experts and experts in other fields who will 
examine all records of police officers and take the necessary measures against them; 
whether it be their continuation in their posts, their expulsion, or a change in the 
nature of their work.399 This mechanism is of high importance as it will ensure that all 
members of the police will be evaluated based on their education, competence, 
behavior and in particularly adherence to human rights.400  This procedure will not 
only result in the increase of professionalism of the Ministry, but will also 
substantially assist the Ministry in its re-training and capacity-building of its 
employees. This procedure addresses the strategic dimension of impunity where as if 
perpetrators of human rights violations remain in their posts, they can use their powers 
to derail the processes of accountability. In addition, such a vetting mechanism, if 
396 Police for Egypt, supra note 349, at 9. 
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successfully implemented, will not only combat impunity by punishing perpetrators of 
human rights violations and removing them from their posts, but will also provide 
deterrence for future human rights violations. It can thus help change the mentality of 
police officers. After seeing their colleagues criminally punished and removed form 
their posts due to their involvement in human rights violations, the police will soon 
realize that they are no longer above the law. 
Finally, the committee will not only rely on the files of the employees in the Ministry, 
but will also examine reports of the courts, human rights groups and fact-finding 
commissions.401 More importantly, it will consult with victims of human rights 
violations, as well as citizens who are familiar with their local police force.402 This 
point is of crucial important as police officers who are known for their corruption and 
abusive behavior are well-known in their communities; in addition, the Ministry’s files 
of the employees may be biased and not accurate. Thus, by including all these diverse 
sources in the evaluation of the police force, the committee can then ensure that its 
results are accurate and effective. At the same time, in order to ensure fairness, the 
committee will hear out the police officer during his evaluation.403
401 Id at 12.
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VI. Conclusion
While the legal framework that I have adopted has helped to identify the multiple 
dimensions of impunity in the legal system and their modes of operation, the elements 
of impunity that I have raised in this paper are anything but exhaustive. More research 
is needed to analyze more cases in various contexts. The application of this framework 
can help highlight not only the structural dimension of impunity, but also the strategic. 
By identifying how the state uses strategic impunity, proposals for structural reforms 
can be able to anticipate repetition of such decisions and accordingly include 
guarantees that can prevent it from affecting the accountability process.  
Finally, the importance of accountability for human rights abuses is crucial to Egypt's 
transition to democracy. If the police and military remain above the law, there will be 
no deterrence for future regimes to respect their citizens’ rights and uphold the rule of 
law. At the same time, the Egyptian authorities have demonstrated minimal, if any, 
political will to end this cycle of impunity. There will be no measures of serious 
security sector reform, or a fight against impunity, without immense public pressure 
that the authorities could eventually succumb to. Until then, the situation will remain 
as it, where the victims can be punished for the crimes committed against them, and 
the perpetrators walk free. 
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